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Abstract 
 
 
Throughout the developed world and beyond, diversified metropolitan regions 
have replaced the centuries-old divide between city and countryside.   In the 
varied polities of contemporary democracies, the common geographies of 
metropolitan regions have given rise to parallel territorial patterns of electoral 
participation and partisan orientations.   This paper, drawing on a pooled eleven-
country ecological dataset, presents results from the first systematic international 
comparative analysis of these patterns.   We find that the contextual effects from 
metropolitan places on voting go beyond what the social and economic 
composition of those places can explain.  Parties from across the partisan 
spectrum now look to strongholds in particular types of metropolitan settings, 
and compete for dominance in others.   In metropolitanized democracies, 
stronger electoral mobilization among low-density, affluent and middle class 
suburbs has skewed electoral competition.  Metropolitan geographies thus embed 
electoral advantages for parties on the Right, and for parties that embrace 
neoliberal policy agendas.   
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With the advent of the 21
st
 century, metropolitan areas have become the 
dominant form of human settlement. Regardless of the national historical 
differences in processes of urbanisation, a number of common elements now 
characterise metropolitan areas throughout the world. As areas of dispersed 
settlement, they stretch across a multiplicity of communities and jurisdictional 
boundaries. Flows of capital, labour, services and goods act as the glue that 
integrates communities across metropolitan territories. Metropolitan regions are 
embedded in national and transnational urban hierarchies. Some serve as 
economic or cultural centres for a nation or a continent. Others specialise in 
particular kinds of activities that dominate the local economy. 
This volume has investigated how the characteristics of metropolitan places 
influence political behaviour within and among their constituent communities. 
The results show the need to rethink presumptions that have long stood at the 
core of thinking about the geography of modern elections and party systems. The 
nationalisation thesis, which emerged during the time of rapid industrialisation 
in Western Europe and North America, attempted to account for the earlier 
evolution of national political systems out of segmented territorial regions. In a 
nationalised system, electoral competition and contestation occur between 
national social and economic constituencies based on class, ethnicity, or other 
identities, rather than between geographic places. If territorial variation persists, 
then it must be due to the social composition of those territories. In a nationalised 
political system, places are merely containers for the political behaviour of 
different social groups.  
As diverse, expanding metropolitan regions have overwhelmed and 
supplanted old social identities based on the urban/rural divide, metropolitan 
territorial influences have emerged to call this view of political behaviour into 
question. Territorial variations within and between metropolitan regions now 
comprise a major influence on whether and how citizens vote. More than the 
result of random social and economic sorting, these variations are a product of 
metropolitan places themselves. Identical social groups living in metropolitan 
places with distinct interests and lifestyles behave in starkly different ways. 
When they reside in densely populated core cities, where economies of scale 
favour collective provision of services such as public transport or public day 
care, they tend to support programs of state provision. When they reside in 
outlying low-density municipalities, where similar services are more difficult to 
coordinate collectively, the same groups support market provision and 
privatisation over state programs. Even when people can choose their place of 
residence, those choices remain a function of the alternatives embedded in 
existing metropolitan settlement structures. Living in one or another setting 
reinforces prevailing preferences. The metropolitan spatial context thus retains 
significant power to explain the political behaviour of a community.  
The metropolitanisation thesis exemplifies a relationship between scales 
that is intrinsic to many other contemporary processes of global economic and 
social change, from transformations in capitalism (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 
1994) to post-modern cultural shifts (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Although 
national and even global in its extent and impact, metropolitanisation has taken 
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place at the local and regional scale. Within societies dominated by pervasive 
metropolitan patterns, parties of both the Left and Right have found new 
territorial electoral strongholds, and new sources of advantage and disadvantage 
in the competition for votes. Influences from metropolitan places on electoral 
mobilisation have altered the balance of power among these electoral 
constituencies. Over the last twenty years, the cumulative impact of these 
territorial reconfigurations has been a persistent electoral advantage for the 
parties of the Right, and for the neoliberal agendas they have increasingly 
advocated. Metropolitanisation has been a key factor in the rise and pervasive 
influence of neoliberalism. 
Metropolitan territorial configurations pose challenges to the nationalisation 
thesis in several ways. Metropolitanisation has interposed a new set of 
intraregional territorial divides. Rather than rooted in traditional regional 
differences, these place-based configurations of political consciousness are 
embedded in localities and neighbourhoods, and in different metropolitan 
structures. Rather than remain divided into segmented, largely uniform regional 
cultures, metropolitan places are linked to each other through flows of 
commuting, consumption and markets. Among regions that have converged 
toward similar patterns of metropolitan structure, territorial divisions rooted in 
metropolitan life may also erode traditional regional differences in political 
culture. Even when metropolitanisation has had nationalising effects of this kind, 
it has supplemented or supplanted regional divides with metropolitan and local 
ones.  
Metropolitan territorial effects are more contested than the regional party 
configurations that dominated earlier patterns of territorial variation (Caramani 
2004). As metropolitan populations have grown into majorities of the electorate 
throughout most developed countries, competition for suburban votes has drawn 
national parties from across much of the ideological spectrum toward neoliberal 
and culturally conservative agendas. Even as these parties retain territorial 
strongholds in certain types of metropolitan places, competition for swing 
communities has frequently produced volatile or mixed territorial patterns of 
metropolitan support.  
Finally, nationalisation implies that national parties operate as vertically 
integrated organisations, and that community behaviour in local elections follows 
patterns in national elections. Instead, a layered examination of metropolitan 
patterns reveals numerous multilevel dynamics in both electoral behaviour and 
the economic, social and spatial influences that shape it.  
This chapter concludes this volume with a comparative multi-level analysis 
of these overarching patterns. The dataset we employ is compiled from the 
national datasets analysed in all the separate country chapters in Sellers et al. 
(2013).
1
 It includes 13,300 municipalities located in 175 metropolitan areas in 
                                                 
1  The compilation of this database was a Herculean task. It would not have been possible without 
the competence and the relentless support of Philippe Rochat, who patiently resolved, one after 
the other, the numerous problems of data incompatibility and inconsistency and managed to 
construct a truly integrated database. In order to avoid misspecification of indicators across 
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eleven countries (Table 1). Alongside analysis of the cross-national 
commonalities and differences, the integrated dataset enables an exploration of 
metropolitan influences that the smaller numbers of metropolitan areas did not 
permit in some of the country chapters. The first section of the chapter will focus 
on patterns of electoral turnout, the second on patterns of partisanship. 
Table 1: Metropolitan municipalities/communities, metropolitan areas and 
countries in the overall sample 
Country 
Total 
number of 
metropolitan 
areas 
Total number 
of 
municipalities/ 
communities* 
Type of municipalities/communities* 
Urban 
concentrations 
Poor (hardship) 
suburbs 
Middle 
class 
suburbs 
Affluent 
suburbs 
Low 
density 
suburbs 
 
High 
minority 
Low 
minority 
   
United States 12 1.935 22 300 317 473 298 525 
Canada 11 369 35 21 32 141 54 86 
United 
Kingdom 
20 394 135 14 17 150 39 39 
France 42 6.774 50 331 843 2.298 539 2.713 
Switzerland 7 482 7 119 119 119 118 
Germany 21 1.166 38 270 363 231 264 
Spain 30 1.053 51 228 456 228 90 
Sweden 3 39 3 1 5 16 6 8 
Poland 21 427 32 80 149 69 97 
Czech 
Republic 
4 464 5 75 190 101 93 
Israel 4 197 14 70 26 30 13 44 
Total 175 13.300 392 2.749 4.385 1.697 4.077 
Notes: * = In Canada and the United Kingdom, a lack of sufficient municipalities in many 
metropolitan regions required the substitution of electoral districts for the purposes of categorising 
communities. In some cases the boundaries of such districts adhere to those of municipalities, but in 
many metros there are many more such districts than there are municipalities (indeed, in many cases 
there are only one or two municipalities for the entire metropolitan area). 
Metropolitan patterns of electoral participation 
Political participation is the foundation of democracy, and participation in 
elections is perhaps the most fundamental act of democratic citizenship. 
Moreover, it is one of the most reliable and readily available empirical indicators 
of political behaviour. A first step toward unravelling the metropolitan 
determinants of political behaviour has therefore consisted of an analysis of 
turnout in local and national elections
2
, aggregated to the municipal level. 
Analysis of this dataset demonstrates clear limits to the nationalisation of 
                                                                                                              
countries, the integrated database has been confined to only those variables that are identical in 
all the countries (see the procedures described in the methodological appendices). 
2  Except for the U.S. results, all the country data and analyses of turnout presented are based on 
official electoral data. This means that the turnout rate is based on a comparison of the number of 
voters and the number of registered electors. In the U.S., voluntary voter registration leaves 
official tallies of eligible voters much less representative than in other countries. U.S. turnout 
data here is based on census figures for the voting age population who are naturalised or native 
born citizens (see Sellers 2013). 
6 
 
electoral behaviour, and the importance of systematic differences at the 
metropolitan and local levels to patterns of voting turnout. 
Nationalisation, Localisation or Fragmentation? 
What cross-national political effects has metropolitanisation had? The pooled 
dataset of national and municipal results enables an analysis of the territorial 
heterogeneity of local participatory patterns at both municipal and national 
levels. In addition to uniformity, the nationalisation of politics implies 
integration of municipal elections into national electoral patterns. The 
comparison of municipal and national turnout rates provides the first rigorous 
cross-national test of this dimension of nationalisation. 
Figure 1: Relations between national and local electoral participation, 
overall means by countries 
 
 
7 
 
Table 2: Territorial Heterogeneity of Metropolitan Turnout in Municipal Elections by Country 
 Election(s) 
S 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
National S 
Post-WWII 
(Caramani 
2005) 
S² 
(Variance) 
National S2 
Post-WWII 
(Caramani 
2005) 
MAD: 
Mean 
Absolute 
Deviation 
National 
MAD Post-
WWII 
(Caramani 
2005) 
MSD: 
Mean 
Squared 
Deviation 
National 
MSD Post-
WWII 
(Caramani 
2005) 
IPR 
Variability 
Coefficient 
N 
United States 1996-2003 12.85  165.07  10.38  164.97  0.41 0.41 1606 
Canada mid-2000s 14.58  212.48  12.13  210.96  0.36 0.32 140 
Switzerland 1996-2005 13.87 14.32 192.45 212.66 11.45 10.59 191.83 205.88 0.35 0.30 314 
Israel 1999-2003 15.92  253.48  13.42  252.01  0.30 0.22 172 
East-Germany 1999-2003 9.13  83.35  7.48  83.13  0.26 0.16 371 
Poland 1994-2002 6.82  46.49  5.44  46.38  0.25 0.16 445 
Czech Republic 1994-2002 9.54  90.93  7.36  90.74  0.24 0.14 464 
France 2001 9.73 3.40 94.58 11.82 7.83 2.56 94.57 11.69 0.23 0.13 6784 
Germany 1999-2003 7.36 6.49 54.22 23.02 5.79 2.55 54.17 22.15 0.22 0.13 1159 
Spain 1995-2003 8.80 6.01 77.49 36.68 7.26 4.48 77.42  0.22 0.12 1049 
West-Germany 1999-2003 6.31  39.82  4.99  39.77  0.21 0.11 788 
United Kingdom 2004 (London only) 3.06 5.75 9.38 34.51 2.62 4.14 9.10 34.46 0.20 0.09 33 
Sweden 1998-2002 4.46 1.54 19.89 2.91 3.47 1.21 19.38 2.81 0.15 0.06 39 
Notes: For calculation of indexes see Caramani (2004, 2005). Indexes from Caramani (2005: 307) based on Lower Chamber legislative elections. 
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Table 3: Territorial Heterogeneity of Metropolitan Turnout in National Elections by Country 
 Election(s) 
S 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Overall S 
Post-WWII 
(Caramani 
2005) 
S² 
(Variance) 
Overall S2 
Post-WWII 
(Caramani 
2005) 
MAD: 
Mean 
Absolute 
Deviation 
Overall 
MAD Post-
WWII 
(Caramani 
2005) 
MSD: 
Mean 
Squared 
Deviation 
Overall 
MSD Post-
WWII 
(Caramani 
2005) 
IPR 
Variability 
Coefficient 
N 
United States 1996-2004 11.96  142.98  9.37  142.90  0.28 0.20 1841 
Poland 1993-2001 6.98  48.71  5.74  48.60  0.25 0.15 445 
Switzerland 1999-2003 6.72 14.32 45.12 212.66 5.41 10.59 45.03 205.88 0.25 0.15 482 
United Kingdom 2001 (England + Wales) 6.61 5.75 43.65 34.51 5.41 4.14 43.53 34.46 0.22 0.12 361 
Israel 1999-2003 8.41  70.72  6.54  70.36  0.21 0.11 197 
Canada 2006 5.01  25.13  3.85  24.97  0.17 0.08 156 
Spain 1996-2004 5.83 6.01 33.95 36.68 4.52 4.48 33.92  0.17 0.08 1052 
Czech Republic 1996-2002 5.36  28.73  4.23  28.66  0.17 0.07 464 
France 2001 5.51 3.40 30.41 11.82 4.32 2.56 30.40 11.69 0.17 0.07 6784 
East-Germany 1998-2002 5.08  25.80  4.26  25.73  0.17 0.07 373 
Germany 1998-2002 4.80 6.49 23.01 23.02 3.63 2.55 22.99 22.15 0.15 0.06 1162 
Sweden 1998-2002 3.54 1.54 12.50 2.91 2.74 1.21 12.18 2.81 0.13 0.04 39 
West-Germany 1998-2002 2.82  7.94  2.21  7.93  0.12 0.03 789 
Notes: For calculation of indexes see Caramani (2004, 2005). Indexes for France and U.S. from Caramani (2005) based on Lower Chamber legislative elections. 
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Comparison by country of the (unweighted) average turnout for the two types of 
elections (municipal and national) reveals striking differences in this dimension 
(Figure 1). In several countries, high average participation in both types of 
elections leaves little doubt that there is strong national-local electoral 
integration. In Sweden, France, Israel and Spain, turnout rates for both types of 
elections average 70 per cent or higher. Since the electorate for municipal 
elections in Sweden includes all resident noncitizens, and in the other EU 
countries all resident EU citizens, the convergence of turnout in these countries 
is all the more impressive.
3
 
In other countries a tendency toward de-localisation is clear. In the Anglo-
American nations of the United States, Canada and the UK (albeit in the latter 
case, based on a much more limited London area sample) this de-localised 
pattern is most pronounced. Average national turnout rates in these countries 
have approached or exceeded 60 per cent, but local voter turnout rates ranging 
from 46 per cent (in Canada) to 31 per cent (in the U.S.) give rise to significant 
turnout gaps between the two scales of governance. More limited de-localisation 
is also present in West Germany.  
The lower national and municipal turnout rates in Switzerland indicate a 
more general voter disengagement as well as limited national-local integration. 
This is the only nation that can truly be characterised as having a generally 
localised political culture, although subnational and national electoral dynamics 
are becoming increasingly integrated (Selb 2006). 
The three postcommunist territories, where a general disengagement from 
voting has also been noted (Kostadinova 2003), reveal some distinct patterns. In 
each, participation in one type of election or the other averages lower than in 
settled democracies with relatively similar systems of institutions. In East 
Germany, participation averages lower than in West Germany. In the Czech 
Republic turnout in local elections is lower than in other systems with similarly 
stable party systems and high national turnout. In Poland, both national and local 
participation average relatively low.  
Comparison of overall turnout rates in national and local elections already 
suggests important variations in the way that electoral institutions function. To 
further assess how these variations might be related to metropolitanisation and 
nationalisation we turn our attention to how uniformly turnout rates vary among 
metropolitan territories. An established line of research focused on the territorial 
homogeneity of electoral behaviour across time and space has developed several 
indices for this purpose (Caramani 2005). Tables 2 and 3 show calculations of 
six such indexes for the metropolitan dataset, by country: the standard deviation; 
the variance: the mean absolute deviation; the mean squared deviation; the 
variability coefficient, and the IPR index. The latter, based on the differences 
between the turnout rate in each municipality and the overall mean of turnout 
across all municipalities, takes into account the number and size of 
                                                 
3  As a result, rules for nonvoting by noncitizens correlated negatively with turnout in the pooled 
dataset and any independent effects from those rules could not be sorted out. 
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municipalities (Table 2 and Table 3). For purposes of illustration, Figure 2 
displays the IPR values for turnout rates in local and national elections.  
Figure 2: Territorial heterogeneity of voter turnout (national and municipal 
elections) in the metropolitan areas of eleven countries (IPR index) 
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Notes: National elections: France: 2001 (presidential election), US: 1996-2004 (presidential 
election), Sweden: 1998-2002, Switzerland: 1999-2003, Israel: 1999-2003, Czech Republic: 1996-
2002, UK: 2001, Germany: 1998-2002, Poland: 1993-2001, Canada: 2006, Spain: 1996-2004. 
Municipal elections: France: 2001, USA: 1996-2003, Sweden: 1998-2002, Switzerland: 1996-2005, 
Israel: 1999-2003, Czech Republic: 1994-2002, Germany: 1999-2003, Poland: 1994-2002, Canada: 
mid-2000s (Montréal, Vancouver and Toronto metropolitan areas), Spain: 1995-2003. * = UK local 
election turnout for Greater London Authority election only (2004). 
 
The six indices converge around similar results. Within most countries, they 
show significant variation in the electoral participation of metropolitan 
municipalities. In municipal elections this territorial heterogeneity is especially 
pronounced. For every country analysed in Caramani (2004) except Switzerland, 
the metropolitan indices of variability in municipal election turnout range 
consistently higher than corresponding figures for national elections based on all 
national election districts (Table 2). In France, Germany, Spain and Sweden, 
metropolitan municipal turnout varies more dramatically, producing index values 
at double or triple the national figures. Even in national elections, where turnout 
rates are generally more uniform (Figure 2), the metropolitan indexes in most of 
these countries are somewhat higher than those for all parliamentary 
constituencies in national elections (Table 3). Only in two of the most 
territorialised countries, Spain and Switzerland, do slightly lower metropolitan 
indices of variability imply somewhat more uniform results among metropolitan 
localities than among national legislative districts. 
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The territorial heterogeneity of metropolitan voting propensities varies 
significantly among countries (Figure 2). On one end of the spectrum, 
metropolitan communities in the USA, Switzerland, Israel and Canada reveal 
widely differing turnout levels. The great variability in these countries is 
especially evident in local elections (Table 2), but apparent even at the highest 
level of national elections (Table 3). In the post-Communist countries, including 
(former) East Germany, tendencies toward nationalisation are also more 
qualified than in Western European countries. In Poland, the variability of 
turnout in national elections ranges considerably higher than in local elections. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the relatively homogenous territorial 
distribution of turnout in Sweden and West Germany indicates more nationalised 
patterns of electoral participation.  
National differences in institutions, from electoral systems to local 
government systems, account for much of the variation in municipal political 
behaviour. Despite the relatively small number of twelve country cases, simple 
bivariate correlations between several explanatory variables at the country level 
and these national patterns point to numerous relationships that approach or 
exceed statistical significance (Table 4). The predominance of metropolitan 
regions in national politics is strongly related to more general patterns of 
electoral participation, as dominant metropolitan constituencies mobilise in 
national elections at the expense of more marginal ones. National rates of 
metropolitanisation, measured here by the proportion of the national population 
residing in metropolitan areas with populations over 200,000 reveal the highest 
positive correlation with a large national-local turnout gap (at .513, p<.10) (cf. 
Hoffmann-Martinot and Sellers 2005). 
Especially in municipal elections, systematic effects derive from well-
known differences in local government institutions and in relations between local 
and national politics (see Morlan 1984; Page and Goldsmith 1987; Hesse and 
Sharpe 1991; Goldsmith and Page 2010). For example, in ‘civic localist’ 
systems, such as the United States, Switzerland and Canada, much of local 
participation takes place outside of council elections, institutions for local 
governance differ widely among municipalities, and local politics and elections 
maintain fewer links to national politics (Sellers and Kwak 2011). As the 
consistently significant correlations demonstrate, this form of local governance is 
clearly associated with lower turnout at both levels of government, as well as 
greater spatial variation in turnout at both levels.  
In contrast, ‘local elitist’ systems maintain stronger links between national 
and local politics, a factor that Morlan (1984) found to increase electoral 
mobilisation in local elections (the correlation is .503, p<.10). In southern 
European countries like France and Spain, ‘political localism’ (Page 1991) has 
relied on local elected officials to represent local concerns within higher level 
governments. In countries such as Germany, the Czech Republic, and Israel, 
strong links between local and national party organisations account for vertical 
integration (Deschouwer 2003; Razin 1998). Such forms of integration are 
strongest in the relatively ‘nationalised’ local government system of Sweden 
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(Sellers and Lidström 2007), where both national and local turnout in 
metropolitan localities are highest and most uniform. 
Table 4: Bivariate correlations of average local/municipal turnout with 
national institutions 
 
Average 
municipal 
turnout 
Average 
national 
turnout 
Average 
turnout gap 
Municipal 
turnout IPR 
National 
turnout IPR 
Turnout 
gap IPR 
N 
National metropolitanisation -.214 .151 .513 .267 .093 -.275 12 
Civic localist local government 
(Sellers and Kwak 2011) 
-.794 -.636 .484 .642 .558 -.381 11 
Nationalised local government 
(Sellers and Kwak 2011) 
.429 .368 -.232 -.477 -.406 .291 11 
Local elitist local government 
(Sellers and Kwak 2011) 
.519 .402 -.334 -.345 -.305 .200 11 
Third wave of democratization 
(Huntington 1993) 
.128 .031 -.159 -.223 -.039 .264 12 
Proportional representation 
(national) 
.478 .161 -.568 -.344 -.253 .244 11 
Proportional representation 
(local council) 
.670 .575 -.361 -.498 -.530 .212 11 
Election day is rest day or 
holiday 
.733 .328 -.770 -.468 -.381 .299 11 
Easy voting index  
(Blais et al.) 
.068 -.077 -.204 -.095 -.184 -.030 11 
Election day registration .063 -.016 -.121 -.126 -.184 .012 11 
Compulsory registration .287 -.055 -.531 .017 .022 -.005 11 
Notes: Where N = 12, sample includes separate units for East and West Germany.  
For italicized coefficients, p<.10; for boldface coefficients, p<.05; for boldface italicized coefficients, p<.01. 
 
Among other national institutions, proportional and mixed compensatory 
electoral systems have been shown to foster electoral participation to a 
significantly greater degree than first-past-the-post and majoritarian systems 
(Blais et al. 2003). In voting systems that are proportional, every vote has an 
effect on the result. Since even voters for small parties can expect their preferred 
party to gain at least some seats in the legislature, voter turnout under these 
systems should be higher. The direction of the correlations for average turnout is 
consistent with this hypothesis, but only proportional representation in local 
council elections correlates significantly with higher turnout (in local elections 
0.643, and in national elections 0.601, both p<.05). National rules of electoral 
administration also play a role. Turnout is higher when the electoral legislation 
facilitates the exercise of the right to vote (Blais et al. 2003). Holding elections 
on a public holiday correlates with both higher municipal turnout and a lower 
turnout gap.
4
 
                                                 
4  Blais et al. (2003) also construct an ‘ease of voting’ index that aggregates opportunities to vote 
by correspondence, in advance or by proxy. Facilitating voter registration by making it 
obligatory, by making it possible to register on Election Day, or by making the government 
rather than individual citizens responsible for taking the initiative in registration can also raise 
the turnout rate. Although correlations demonstrated no significant relation between these 
conditions and the national turnout averages, the directions of the correlations generally 
corresponded to expectations. 
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In the metropolitan areas in this study, the national integration of electoral 
participation rates remains limited. An overview of turnout means from all 
eleven countries in the dataset (Figure 3) confirms considerable cross-national 
variations in degrees of nationalisation, especially in local elections. Whatever 
the effects from national institutions, the wide variations within countries often 
approach or exceed the range of differences among these national averages. Only 
in a few countries, notably Sweden and West Germany, do figures for municipal 
and national turnout cluster tightly around the overall mean. Only these countries 
can be considered to possess fully integrated systems.
5
 
Figure 3: Turnout in national and municipal elections in metropolitan 
municipalities of ten countries (West and East-Germany as two separate 
countries) 
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Understanding Multi-Scalar Spatial Effects on Turnout 
Differences among metropolitan regions comprise one of the main sources of 
variations in turnout, and help to account for significant part of the differences 
among nations. In nearly every country in this study, the analyses have affirmed 
that higher population density and larger size reduce turnout in elections (Table 
5). Across the entire dataset, just as Preteceille (2000) found for France, larger 
metropolitan areas have lower voting rates. This effect is much stronger in 
municipal elections, where ties to a local community within the wider metropolis 
                                                 
5  The scatter plots also reveal a variety of relationships between national and local turnout 
patterns, from the linear co-variation in Sweden (Pearson r=0.98), to the much more limited 
relationships in the United States (r = 0.50), Poland (r=0.109) and Israel (r = -0.009). 
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play a more crucial role in voter mobilisation.
6
 Several other structural features 
of metropolitan areas also correlate intriguingly with local turnout rates (Table 
5). Metro-level correlations suggest that a lower turnout gap (between national 
and local participation rates) is linked to geopolitical fragmentation and possibly 
population concentration. The Zeigler-Brunn index of geopolitical fragmentation 
correlates significantly with national turnout, but even more strongly with 
municipal turnout, and therefore with a smaller turnout gap.
7
 Socio-spatial 
diversity and polarisation also correlate significantly enough to bolster the case 
that metropolitan structure has independent effects on turnout. Metropolitan 
variations also comprise an important source of the cross-national differences. 
Fully 48 per cent of the variation in metropolitan polarisation, 45 per cent of the 
variation in metropolitan population concentration, and 41 per cent of the 
variation in metropolitan geopolitical fragmentation occur between countries, 
rather than within them 
Decades of electoral research have of course shown election turnout to be 
influenced by a broad range of variables beyond the macro-institutional setting 
and the metropolitan context (see Franklin 2004; Geys 2006). A full analysis of 
why communities vary in turnout must also take into account place-related 
variables describing the spatial contextual attributes of a community, as well as 
variables related to the motivation and resources of individual citizens to engage 
in the act of voting. To separate out these influences, analysis of the integrated 
dataset employed multi-level modelling techniques similar to those used in most 
of the country chapters. 
Predicting Turnout in Local Elections 
Participation in municipal elections is influenced by factors operating at all three 
scales of governance. According to a simple analysis of variance, the differences 
between countries that have traditionally been the focus of cross-national turnout 
comparisons leave 29 per cent of the variance unexplained. Since as much as 48 
per cent of the variance between countries also corresponds to metropolitan and 
local variation, subnational effects are likely at work beyond what this initial 
figure suggests. At least 25 per cent of the overall variance occurs at the 
municipal/community scale, and at least six per cent at the metropolitan scale. 
The country chapters showed that municipal characteristics exert numerous 
influences on local election turnout, and account for an important part of the 
variation in municipal election turnout within countries. 
                                                 
6  A logged variable for metropolitan population correlates strongly (-0.409, p<.01) with lower 
turnout in municipal elections, but just short of significantly (-0.146, p<.10) with national 
election turnout. As the country analyses of the United States and France both found, the 
combined effect is an even stronger positive correlation with the gap between national and local 
electoral participation (0.474, p<.01). 
7  A related measure of total population concentration, the Herfindahl index, measures the overall 
population concentration among metropolitan municipalities. Although this index correlates 
weakly with either national or local turnout, it correlates significantly with a lower turnout gap. 
Although the correlation between this index and the Zeigler-Brunn Index is significant (0.407, 
p<.01), it remains low enough to permit independent effects from overall population 
concentration in some of the following models. 
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Table 5: Bivariate correlations of average local/municipal turnout with 
metropolitan structure 
  
National turnout 
(average) 
Municipal turnout 
(average) 
Turnout gap 
Metropolitan population (log) 
 -.146 -.409 .474 
N 175 148 148 
Metropolitan population concentration 
(Herfindahl index) 
 -.079 .054 -.191 
N 144 144 144 
Metropolitan geopolitical fragmentation 
(Zeigler-Brunn index) 
 .199 .329 -.261 
N 155 147 147 
Metropolitan sociospatial polarisation 
(three-category Simpson Index) 
 -.125 -.539 .339 
N 175 148 148 
City-suburban polarisation 
(aggregated Nathan Adams index) 
 .083 -.175 .480 
N 141 121 121 
Metropolitan affluence 
 .023 -.067 .063 
N 175 148 148 
Notes: For boldface coefficients, p<.05; for boldface italicized coefficients, p<.01. 
 
Multi-level regressions based on the pooled dataset enabled an encompassing test 
of national and metropolitan differences alongside others tested in the country 
chapters (Table 6). After tests of alternative hierarchical and non-hierarchical 
models, we settled on a set of three-level hierarchical models that incorporated 
effects at the municipal (level 1), the metropolitan (level 2), and the national 
levels (level 3). The models thus fitted included a linear model, a model with 
cross-level interactions, and a combined model.
8
 Metropolitan effects, combined 
with dichotomous place variables for each of the different types of metropolitan 
municipalities/communities, accounted for 50-51 per cent of the local variance 
and 23 per cent of overall variance in turnout.  
Certain structural and institutional features of metropolitan areas exert 
especially strong influences. The models point to a robust ‘large is lively’ effect 
(Kelleher and Lowery 2004). The more the population of a metropolitan area is 
concentrated in a small number of municipalities, the higher the turnout in local 
elections. Since the separate measure of metropolitan geopolitical fragmentation, 
the Zeigler and Brunn (1980) index, also raises municipal election turnout, the 
model provides simultaneous support for the countervailing ‘small is beautiful’ 
thesis. A significant cross-level variable in the full model shows that the latter 
effect concentrates strongly in countries with civic localist local government 
systems. These specific structural features of metropolitan areas overwhelmed 
influences from the other metropolitan variables that correlated with variations in 
turnout.  
                                                 
8  At both the municipal and the metropolitan levels, the model included weights to correct for the 
different numbers of municipalities and metropolitan areas in the country samples. Final 
variables for each model were selected through backward regression. 
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Table 6: Multi-level regression analysis of municipal election turnout 
  Linear model Crosslevel effects Combined model 
  B t B t B t 
Intercept 74.34 4.37 80.02 4.67 88.86 9.09 
Country level variables 
      Metropolitanisation -0.13 -0.50 -0.13 -0.49 
  Civic localism 
    
-55.62 -7.69 
Third wave democracies 
    
-1.00 -0.45 
Election day holiday 
    
-32.34 -3.75 
Ease of voting 
    
33.17 4.17 
Compulsory registration 
    
14.43 6.31 
Metropolitan and cross level variables 
     Population concentration 7.96 2.93 7.42 2.69 7.45 2.72 
Geopolitical fragmentation 0.14 2.51 0.13 2.27 0.10 1.72 
Civic localism (country) 
    
0.76 2.51 
Sociospatial polarisation -4.77 -1.76 -4.85 -1.77 -3.85 -1.42 
Metropolitan population -0.82 -0.84 -1.70 -1.61 -1.04 -0.98 
Metropolitan affluence -0.24 -0.17 -1.46 -0.98 -1.73 -1.18 
Municipal and cross-level variables  
     Urban concentrations 2.23 3.45 -31.23 -4.29 -33.14 -4.43 
Herfindahl index (metropolitan) 
  
9.90 2.66 13.24 3.02 
Metropolitan population (metro) 
  
4.65 3.76 5.47 4.18 
Metropolitan affluence (metro) 
  
8.79 3.39 8.33 3.00 
Affluent suburbs -0.50 -1.58 -3.83 -4.38 0.20 0.31 
Civic localism (country) 
    
4.15 4.49 
Third wave democracies (country) 
    
1.51 2.59 
Compulsory registration (country) 
    
-1.84 -2.80 
Simpson index (metro) 
  
7.75 4.09 
  Low density suburbs 0.61 1.98 0.62 1.99 0.72 2.32 
Muncipal population (log) -10.05 -33.55 -7.84 -13.00 -8.11 -12.30 
Zeigler-Brunn index (metro) 
  
-0.10 -3.45 -0.10 -3.30 
Metropolitan affluence (metro) 
  
-3.21 -3.30 -2.68 -2.43 
Poor nonminority suburbs -0.30 -1.21 -0.37 -1.51 0.46 0.87 
Metropolitan affluence (metro) 
    
-2.05 -1.74 
Poor minority suburbs  -1.99 -3.14 -13.52 -5.24 -0.39 -0.47 
Metrpolitanisation (country) 
  
0.21 4.71 
  Zeigler-Brunn index (metro) 
    
-0.17 -2.18 
Log likelihood 
 
-39192 
 
-39159 
 
-39132 
Reliability:  Level one 
 
0.97 
 
0.97 
 
0.96 
Level two 
 
0.98 
 
0.98 
 
0.69 
Variance explained 
      Local 
 
50% 
 
51% 
 
51% 
Metropolitan 
 
8% 
 
9% 
 
13% 
National  
 
15% 
 
15% 
 
97% 
Total 
 
23% 
 
23% 
 
82% 
Deviance 
 
78384 
 
78318 
 
78265 
Estimated parameters 
 
43 
 
50 
 
58 
N   12162  12162  12162 
Notes: Coefficients are full maximum likelihood estimates in HLM3 module of HLM.  
For italicized coefficients, p<.10; for boldface coefficients, p<.05. 
 
The multi-level models confirm important and consistent place effects from 
distinct types of suburban localities, even when national differences are taken 
into account. In all three models, the large negative effect from population size 
on municipal turnout overwhelms the other variables. Beyond this effect itself, 
municipal turnout is also consistently higher in low-density suburbs. Variables 
for cross-level interactions also show the effect from municipal size to depend 
partly on metropolitan structures. In more affluent and middle class metropolitan 
areas, and in those with higher levels of geopolitical fragmentation, smaller 
communities also have disproportionately higher turnout rates than elsewhere. 
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Each of these relationships extends beyond the United States, and beyond North 
America. Rather than products of a distinct national culture, they must be 
understood as global consequences of metropolitan settlement. 
At the same time, many of the largest, most densely populated and most 
central metropolitan communities have more lively and engaging municipal 
elections. As the dichotomous variable for urban concentrations demonstrates, 
municipal turnout in these settings averages significantly higher than their size 
would predict. The models with cross-level interactions indicate that this effect is 
confined to particular metropolitan contexts. Municipal election turnout in 
metropolitan urban centres is higher where the metropolitan population is more 
concentrated, bigger and/or more affluent. Beyond these settings, turnout in 
urban centres is significantly lower than their size alone would dictate. 
Among affluent suburbs, the models reveal a surprising exception to the 
greater mobilisation that has generally been found among affluent voters. As the 
French and Polish analyses observed, the lower turnout of this type of 
community in municipal elections suggests a disengagement from local politics 
that has not been noted before. Yet the effect is inconsistent, and there are 
caveats. The affluent suburbs of civic localist countries, third-wave democracies, 
and more divided metropolitan regions turn out more often to vote. And where 
compulsory national voter registration laws are present, the differential in turnout 
rates between affluent suburbs and other communities diminishes. 
Among poor suburbs, the effects from class-related differences are also 
inconsistent. Poor minority suburbs turn out to vote consistently less than 
elsewhere (at least in the first two models).
9
 Only in more affluent metropolitan 
areas does the same effect hold in poor nonminority suburbs. 
Institutional factors account for much of the differences in spatial-
contextual effects across communities. Variables that capture cross-national 
differences in institutions and politics raise the overall proportion of variance 
explained from 23 to 82 per cent. Although the small number of countries 
necessitates caution about making too many inferences from this result, we note 
that our sample includes a distribution of cases that span the range of 
institutional alternatives. Of these, the civic localism of the Anglo-American 
democracies and Switzerland exerts the strongest single direct effect. It produces 
unevenness in participation even as it depresses overall turnout, fostering higher 
participation in affluent suburbs but lower turnout in poor minority suburbs. 
Meanwhile, both ease of voting and compulsory registration raise turnout 
significantly, while interaction with other national-institutional variables 
produces a significant negative coefficient for the Election Day holiday.  
Importantly, the full model with the national-institutional variables included 
serves to confirm the independence and significance of most effects at the 
metropolitan and local levels. Beyond what established sources of cross-national 
                                                 
9  The addition of national institutional differences to the third model eliminates this effect, except 
for a significantly lower turnout rate among poor minority concentrations located in more 
fragmented metropolitan regions. 
18 
 
differences can explain, influences at these levels account for nearly a quarter of 
the overall variation in municipal turnout. 
Predicting Participation in National Elections 
As Figure 1 showed, turnout rates in national elections are generally higher, and 
in some countries much higher, than in municipal elections. Although many of 
the same contextual factors account for variations in national and municipal 
turnout, there are also important differences linked to metropolitan and local 
characteristics. The more mobilised electorate of national elections is generally 
more biased in favour of affluent and middle class municipalities and against 
more diverse, more polarised metropolitan areas. National levels of 
metropolitanisation also make a difference in promoting turnout in national 
elections that is not evident in municipal elections.  
Metropolitan structure contributes in largely similar ways to national 
turnout as to municipal turnout, but with significant variations. Metropolitan 
population concentration fosters significantly higher voting rates, although the 
coefficients remain smaller and less significant than for municipal elections 
(Table 7). Polarisation among metropolitan communities depresses national 
turnout even more strongly than it does municipal turnout. However, the positive 
effects from intergovernmental fragmentation on municipal election turnout 
disappear altogether in national elections. The large size that results from 
concentrated population thus fosters liveliness less in national elections than in 
municipal ones. The smallness that follows from metropolitan jurisdictional 
fragmentation, whatever its beauty for municipal democracy, lacks any 
discernible influence on national electoral participation.
10
 
At the level of local communities, the cross-country analysis of national 
participation rates identifies greater mobilisation among affluent and middle 
class communities than in municipal elections, on the one hand, and lower 
mobilisation among poor communities on the other. This is especially 
pronounced in civic localist countries, and those scoring low on Blais et al.’s 
(2003) ease of voting scale. This effect is furthermore linked to high levels of 
metropolitanisation and greater metropolitan size. 
Unlike in municipal elections, moreover, both poor minority suburbs and 
poor nonminority suburbs experience significantly lower turnout rates. These 
communities are thus significantly under-represented in national electorates. For 
both types of disadvantaged communities, as the cross-level interactions 
demonstrate, these effects concentrate in civic localist countries, in larger 
metropolitan areas, and in countries with higher rates of metropolitanisation.  
                                                 
10  It could be argued that the Zeigler-Brunn and Simpson indices measure a similar phenomenon 
that manifests itself at different scales of analysis. Thus municipal fragmentation, which is 
associated with socio-spatial polarisation among municipalities, has stronger effects at the 
municipal level, while polarisation among households more generally has stronger effects on 
national electoral participation. 
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Table 7: Multi-level regression analysis of national election turnout 
  Linear model Crosslevel effects Combined model 
  B t B t B t 
Intercept 49.14 3.56 47.88 3.47 101.58 10.93 
Country variables: 
      Metropolitanisation 0.26 1.18 0.30 1.38 
  Civic localism 
    
-46.95 -6.34 
Third wave democracies 
    
-2.08 -0.90 
Election day holiday 
    
-31.71 -3.25 
Ease of voting 
    
27.06 3.04 
Election day registration 
    
-21.76 -5.43 
Compulsory registration 
    
-4.48 -1.69 
Metropolitan level variables: 
      Population concentration 5.22 2.43 3.59 1.58 5.58 2.53 
Geopolitical fragmentation -0.03 -0.72 0.05 0.91 0.02 0.30 
Sociospatial polarisation -4.74 -2.17 -6.75 -2.97 -4.46 -1.98 
Metropolitan population (log) 1.07 1.32 1.12 1.32 0.52 0.61 
Metropolitan affluence 1.60 1.39 0.28 0.22 0.38 0.31 
Muncipal and cross-level variables:  
     Urban concentrations 0.31 0.61 -0.31 -0.12 -3.04 -3.35 
Metropolitanisation (country) 
  
-0.12 -3.09 
  Herfindahl index (metro) 
  
7.53 2.49 
  Simpson index (metro) 
  
8.10 2.73 
  Metropolitan affluence 
  
4.85 2.65 5.69 3.33 
Affluent suburbs 1.40 4.39 -13.29 -3.52 2.97 6.14 
Metropolitanisation (country) 
  
0.05 2.01 
  Civic localism (country) 
    
8.31 12.23 
Ease of voting (country) 
    
-6.61 -4.69 
Metropolitan population (metro) 
  
2.09 3.23 
  Low density suburbs -1.26 -6.86 -16.89 -7.37 -10.13 -4.81 
Metropolitanisation (country) 
  
0.05 3.12 
  Election day holiday (country) 
    
-2.64 -4.67 
Herfindahl index (metro) 
  
3.79 2.95 3.53 2.82 
Zeigler-Brunn Index (metro) 
  
0.05 2.22 0.05 2.12 
Simpson index (metro) 
  
-2.53 -2.57 -2.25 -2.29 
Metropolitan population (metro) 
  
2.22 6.48 1.93 6.30 
Muncipal population (log) -3.02 -10.74 -2.32 -6.61 -2.97 -9.24 
Election day registration (country) 
    
7.25 9.30 
Zeigler-Brunn Index (metro) 
  
-0.13 -4.05 -0.08 -3.00 
Poor nonminority suburbs -1.68 -7.74 5.63 2.11 -1.45 -7.44 
Civic localism (country) 
    
-4.07 -6.46 
Metropolitan population (metro) 
  
-1.27 -2.79 
  Poor minority suburbs -2.73 -7.11 7.26 1.66 3.51 0.93 
Metropolitanisation (country) 
  
-0.06 -2.30 
  Civic localism (country) 
    
-3.83 -3.29 
Herfindahl index (metro) 
  
5.74 1.61 
  Metropolitan population (metro) 
  
-1.29 -1.77 -1.04 -1.67 
Log likelihood 
 
-36308 
 
-36257 
 
-36186 
Reliability:  Level one 
 
0.98 
 
0.98 
 
0.98 
Level two 
 
0.98 
 
0.98 
 
0.77 
Variance explained 
      Local 
 
34% 
 
34% 
 
34% 
Metropolitan 
 
-22% 
 
-10% 
 
-8% 
National  
 
26% 
 
26% 
 
96% 
Total 
 
24% 
 
26% 
 
82% 
Deviance 
 
72617 
 
72515 
 
72371 
Estimated parameters 
 
43 
 
59 
 
61 
N   12839  12839  12839 
Notes: Coefficients are full maximum likelihood estimates in HLM3 module of HLM.  
For italicized coefficients, p<.10; for boldface coefficients, p<.05.  
 
Municipal size has similar effects in national elections as it does on municipal 
elections, albeit on a more limited scale. However, there is a clear difference 
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among low density suburbs. Distinguished in municipal elections by 
significantly higher turnout rates than elsewhere, these localities vote at 
significantly lower rates in national elections. This effect is especially 
pronounced in smaller, more polarised, less concentrated, and less geopolitically 
fragmented metropolitan areas, and in countries with lower levels of 
metropolitanisation.  
With a few exceptions, the national-institutional influences on participation 
in national elections are more difficult to distinguish. However, there is a clear 
relationship with civic localism. This form of governance retains a significant 
association with lower overall national turnout, and with both higher rates in 
affluent suburbs and lower rates in poor and minority suburbs. Election-day 
registration has a negative relationship with national turnout as a result of multi-
collinearity with other national-institutional influences, but a positive cross-level 
relationship with larger municipalities.  
Finally, the significance of greater metropolitanisation at the national scale 
for national election turnout points to a more general relationship between 
metropolitanisation and national patterns of electoral mobilisation. Analyses of 
metropolitan political influence in the national policymaking process of the 
United States have convincingly demonstrated how the growing power of 
affluent and middle class suburbs over the twentieth century marginalised 
representatives from inner-city and disadvantaged communities (Mollenkopf 
1983; Wolman and Marckini 1998). The results here suggest that these 
differentials in influence are a transnational consequence of metropolitanisation 
that is connected to differences in electoral mobilisation itself. 
Metropolitanisation raises national election turnout in affluent and low density 
suburbs, and lowers it in urban concentrations and poor minority suburbs. These 
effects may come about partly through differences in the influence of 
representatives from these types of places on electoral laws, policies and other 
institutions. The effects from national metropolitanisation are clearly collinear 
with effects from the national institutional differences tested in the full model, 
and disappear when the institutional variables are included.  
Metropolitanisation at the national scale thus has systemic consequences for 
the mobilisation of different types of metropolitan communities. In the most 
metropolitanised polities, affluent, middle class and low density suburbs 
mobilise more effectively than others to maintain their predominant position in 
the metropolitan electorate. On top of the difficulties that municipal size and 
urban density create for mobilisation, urban concentrations and poor suburbs 
face a growing numerical disadvantage in the national electoral competition to 
influence public policy. 
Metropolitanisation and Electoral Participation 
The spread of metropolitan settlement has established systematic geographic 
variations in political participation. Predominant accounts of political 
nationalisation by Caramani (2004) have failed to recognise this complex 
reterritorialisation of politics. Older distinctions between urban and rural 
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settlement, or between discrete territorial regions between countries, cannot 
capture the main lines of the resulting divisions within and between metropolitan 
areas. Numerous consequences from metropolitanisation, including increasingly 
uneven electoral participation in larger cities and divided, dispersed metropolitan 
regions, have undoubtedly contributed to the declining overall turnout levels in 
developed democracies over the last decades (Fuchs and Klingemann 1995). As 
the multilevel analysis of turnout has shown, a simple transnational typology of 
local places and metropolitan characteristics captures a remarkable proportion of 
the cross-national local variation.  
A final question concerns the degree to which turnout patterns are simply a 
result of the social composition of an electorate who happens to live in distinct 
types of places, rather than consequences from the characteristics of places 
themselves. While the demographic composition of municipalities remains a 
major predictor of turnout rates, and in national elections can account for most of 
the explained variation in participation (Table 7), the fine-grained analyses of the 
country chapters in Sellers et al. (2013) confirm that it is indeed features of the 
local and metropolitan spatial contexts that make much of the difference (Table 
8). They frequently predict municipal turnout better than demographic 
composition does, and provide alternative accounts to socioeconomic 
characteristics for a further proportion of the variation. The country chapters 
confirm a variety of specific spatial effects: 
 The negative effect of population size and/or population density on 
election turnout stands out as an overall result. In every country, turnout 
in at least one type of election falls with the population size or 
population density of a municipality. In eight of eleven countries, this 
relationship holds for both national and local elections. The independent 
effects of population size and density alongside each other, where both 
are available and significant, confirm a clear ‘small is beautiful’ effect.  
 In every European and North American democracy where 
homeownership was tested, it exerts a positive effect on turnout in 
elections at one or both levels beyond the effects of demographic 
composition.  
 In four of the six countries where occupational diversity was tested, it 
had negative effects on turnout in elections at one or both levels. More 
economically homogenous communities generally turn out to vote 
more.  
 The presence of commuters has diverse effects on turnout rates that are 
related to national differences in the social geography of cities. For 
example, in the U.S. and Sweden, the effect in local elections is 
negative whereas in both local and national elections of France and 
Spain, and in national elections in Germany, commuting is a significant 
predictor of higher turnout. The research from Canada suggests these 
differences derive partly from the way that social class interacts with 
the automobile dependence of places. 
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Table 8: Influences on local/municipal level turnout in local and national elections, overview of country results 
 Israel Germany USA UK Canada Spain France Poland Switzerland Sweden Czech Rep. 
Metropolitanisation 100% 83% 78% 76% 64% 54% 52% 42% 40% 32% 28% 
 Loc Nat Loc Nat Loc Nat Loc Nat Loc Nat Loc Nat Loc Nat Loc Nat Loc Nat Loc Nat Loc Nat 
Compositional variables at municipal level 
Socio-economic status - (+) + + + + 0 + 0 0 (+) + + + 0 0 0 + + + (-) + 
Hardship index n.a. n.a. 0 0 0 - - - - - 0 0 - - - - 0 - n.a. n.a. (-) - 
Foreign born residents n.a. 0 0 - 0 0 (+) + 0 0 - (-) - - n.a. n.a. 0 - - - 0 0 
Old residents (-) 0 + 0 + + 0 + 0 0 + + 0 0 n.a. n.a. 0 + + 0 (+) + 
Young residents (+) (+) + 0 n.a. n.a. + + 0 0 + + n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 + + 0 (+) 0 
Contextual variables at municipal level 
Homeownership n.a. 0 n.a. n.a. + + 0 + 0 + n.a. n.a. + + n.a. n.a. + (+) (+) (+) (+) 0 
Residential stability n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a 0 + 0 (-) 0 0 n.a. n.a - - + + 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Out-commuting n.a. n.a. 0 + (-) 0 0 0 (-) 0 - 0 + + n.a. n.a. - - 0 0 n.a. n.a. 
Electoral competition n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. + + n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. - - n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Population size - - - - - - n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. - - - - - + - - - 0 - (-) 
Population density (-) 0 - 0 0 (+) 0 - - 0 0 (-) - - - 0 0 + 0 0 n.a. n.a. 
Economic diversity n.a. n.a. - - 0 - - - - 0 + (+) - + n.a. n.a. 0 + n.a. n.a. 0 0 
Notes: + = significant positive relation to turnout; - = significant negative relation to turnout; 0 = no significant relation to turnout; n.a. = relation not tested in 
country study. Parentheses indicate significance in some but not all models. 
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 The presence of commuters has diverse effects on turnout rates that are 
related to national differences in the social geography of cities. For 
example, in the U.S. and Sweden, the effect in local elections is 
negative whereas in both local and national elections of France and 
Spain, and in national elections in Germany, commuting is a significant 
predictor of higher turnout. The research from Canada suggests these 
differences derive partly from the way that social class interacts with 
the automobile dependence of places. 
 Residential stability had a positive influence on election turnout in the 
United States and Poland, but negative effects in the United Kingdom 
and France. Its effects were generally more positive at the municipal 
level than at the national level. 
 Electoral competition likewise has diverse effects on participation. For 
example, it has a positive effect in the United States but negative in 
France.  
 
Not only do these attributes of place matter, but the arrangement and structure of 
metropolitan areas make a large difference. For electoral participation in a 
metropolitan municipality, it matters whether that municipality is located in a 
metropolitan area in which the population is concentrated or dispersed, whether 
the institutional configuration is fragmented or consolidated, whether the socio-
economic pattern is homogenous or diverse, whether the metropolitan area is 
large or small, and whether it is affluent or not. Thus, metropolitanisation 
complicates the local ‘small is beautiful’ and other localised place effects on 
municipal election turnout with a variety of countervailing and reinforcing 
effects at intermediate scales. 
Taken together, the results of the country studies and the pooled analysis 
provide compelling confirmatory evidence for metropolitanisation as an 
important source of variations in national and local political participation, and 
the pervasive gap between them. Beyond this turnout gap itself, the analysis has 
also revealed partly divergent ecological dynamics in national and local 
elections. Especially in local elections, but to an important and overlooked 
degree in national elections as well, features of metropolitan places themselves 
are critical to these dynamics. The continued expansion of metropolitan regions 
compounds and gives growing weight to the processes this analysis has revealed. 
The persistent divergences in turnout between metropolitan places ultimately 
skew patterns of competition between the parties these places support. 
Metropolitanisation and Partisanship 
Metropolitanisation has also transformed the geographic sources of partisan 
loyalties, and in turn national strategies of partisan competition. In doing so, it 
has altered the nationalisation of partisan competition that took place with the 
decline of regionally distinct party systems over the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Place-based partisan divergences that first emerged within 
large established metropolises are becoming mirrored in other metropolitan areas 
24 
 
throughout national territories (Hoffmann-Martinot and Sellers 2005). Where 
similar contrasts within metropolitan areas have emerged in regions with 
traditionally distinct partisan affiliations, the resulting regional convergence may 
seem to bring about a degree of nationalisation. Far from a disappearance of 
territory in national politics, however, metropolitan political divides represent a 
new, embedded source of territorial cleavages that are increasingly central to 
partisan competition. 
Table 9: Levels of territorial heterogeneity of party support in metropolitan 
municipalities/communities across eleven countries (national elections) 
 Country 
Year(s) of 
election 
Cumulative 
S.D. 
Overall 
S.D., 1990s 
IPR 
Overall 
weighted 
IPR, 1990s 
PSNS 
Overall 
PSNS, 
1980s and 
1990s 
(Caramani 
2004) 
(weighted 
summary) 
(Caramani 
2004) 
(Jones and 
Mainwaring 
2003) 
N
at
io
n
al
is
ed
 
United States 1996-2004 26.0  0.32  0.86 0.84 
Sweden 1998-2002 31.3 22.3 0.34 0.29 0.84  
Germany 1998-2002 33.0 55.1 0.34 0.40 0.82  
   West  21.0  0.28  0.89  
   East  26.1  0.32  0.86  
Czech Republic 1996-2002 42.3  0.39  0.78  
France 2001 43.1 34.2 0.39 0.32 0.77  
T
er
ri
to
ri
al
is
ed
 
U.K. (England, Wales) 2001 49.2 53.9 0.40 0.44 0.77  
Poland 1993-2001 59.8  0.46  0.71  
Spain 1996-2004 62.1 57.6 0.48 0.37 0.68  
Switzerland 1999-2003 68.7 102 0.49 0.58 0.67  
Canada 2006 68.9  0.51  0.66 0.72 
Israel 1999-2003 110.8  0.64  0.48  
Notes: PSNS = Party System Nationalization Score (U.S. score from Jones and Mainwaring 
(2003) and IPR for France from Caramani (2004) based on Lower Chamber legislative elections, 
rather than Presidential elections used for IMO dataset. Metropolitan figures calculated by legislative 
districts in the U.K. and Canada, by municipal units in all other countries. 
 
Research on the nationalisation of party systems has devised a number of metrics 
to compare the territorial homogeneity of electoral support for political parties 
among countries and over time (Table 9).
11
 Applied to measure the territorial 
                                                 
11  The IPR index (Caramani 2005: 300), already used to measure heterogeneity in turnout, is based 
on the differences between the share of the votes for each party in the municipality, weighted by 
the number and size of municipalities. The IPR varies between a minimum of zero, signifying a 
perfectly homogenous distribution of partisan support, and one, indicating territorially distinct 
concentrations of support for different parties. The cumulative standard deviation for party 
support is a measure of the dispersion of support of individual parties across municipalities 
within countries. The higher the figure, the higher territorial heterogeneity of party support 
(Caramani 2005: 321). Similarly, the so-called Party System Nationalisation Score (PSNS) 
(Jones and Mainwaring 2003: 143) is based on the Gini coefficient and measures the equality of 
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homogeneity of party support among the metropolitan municipalities in each 
country, these measures correspond remarkably closely to national differences 
found in the literature on party system nationalisation. Caramani’s cut-point for 
distinguishing nationalised from ‘regionalised’ or more territorialized systems12 
yields five countries in the first category and six in the second. For the three 
clearly nationalised countries with comparative metrics (the United States, 
Sweden and France), the indicators show slightly greater territorial heterogeneity 
among metropolitan localities than among national legislative districts. For most 
countries with major regional partisan differences, notably Switzerland, the U.K., 
Germany and Canada, the overall metropolitan variation is less pronounced than 
that among national legislative districts. German metropolitan patterns proved 
sufficiently homogenous to move that country into the Nationalised category. 
Especially there and in Switzerland, metropolitan divisions have overlaid 
regional ones with elements of cross-regional standardisation. In countries with 
less stark historical regional divisions, metropolitan divisions appear to capture 
and even accentuate the overall levels of national territorial heterogeneity.
13
 
Measures likes these from the nationalisation literature provide no way of 
sorting out territorial heterogeneity at the metropolitan and local scales from 
other variation. As noted in the introduction to this volume, it is also important to 
understand how much of the variation in partisanship occurs within as well as 
between metropolitan areas (see Table 1.2 in the introduction). Comparison of 
the variance within and between metropolitan areas in the left-right partisanship 
index of the metropolitan dataset (see infra) demonstrates the pervasive role of 
local variation in the overall patterns (Figure 4). Although the eleven nations in 
our study display quite different mixes of regional and local variation, significant 
territorial variations are present in all of them. Most striking is the absence of 
purely regional heterogeneity. Among countries with high regional variation, 
such as Canada, Spain and Switzerland, the variations are instead multi-scalar. 
Partisan heterogeneity within the metropolitan areas of these countries ranges 
higher than in most of the other cases. Within Israel, the country with the greatest 
territorial variation, the largest component of that variation occurs within 
metropolitan areas.  
The country chapters have already shown many of the ways patterns of 
party support differ systematically across metropolitan communities. This 
metropolitan heterogeneity has added new layers of complexity to previous 
patterns of political regionalism. In some cases metropolitanisation has worked 
                                                                                                              
the share of votes for each party across municipalities, weighted by the overall size of each party. 
The PSNS varies from a minimum of zero, indicating perfectly unequal party support across 
municipalities, to a maximum of one, indicating perfectly equal party support across 
municipalities. The specific strengths and weaknesses of each of these indicators have been 
discussed elsewhere (Caramani 2005). 
12  Since the metrics measure overall territorial heterogeneity, including subregional variation, it is 
misleading to employ ‘regionalised’ as the opposite of ‘nationalised’ (Carmani 2005: 300). Table 
9 adapts Caramani’s categories accordingly. 
13  Caramani also classified Switzerland into a separate group of highly regionalised countries 
(Caramani 2004: 93). However, the metrics he reports for that country in the 1990s (Caramani 
2004: 89), reflected in Table 9, do not place it in that category. 
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to reduce the importance of regionalism. In others the interaction between the 
two has fostered new political allegiances and party relationships. If 
metropolitanisation has levelled some regional variations, it has reinforced 
others. It has entrenched new territorial divides and lines of partisan competition 
among communities and sub-cultures within metropolitan areas. Often, the 
metropolitan places with the most opposed partisan loyalties are located only a 
few minutes apart from each other. In all these respects, metropolitanisation has 
given rise to new forms of territorialisation. 
Figure 4: Change in the level of local and metropolitan variation in 
partisanship over time  
 
Note: Variance reflects the decomposed variance as determined through ANOVA. Years of 
elections: Canada (1981, 2006); Czech Republic (1996, 2002); France (2002); Germany (1998, 
2002); Israel (1999, 2003); Poland (1993, 2001); Spain (1996, 2004); Sweden (1998, 2002); 
Switzerland (1999, 2003); UK (1992, 2001); USA (1996, 2004). 
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Metropolitan patterns of party support: From Nationalisation to 
Metropolitanisation? 
As in the analysis of turnout, cross-national comparison requires that local and 
metropolitan patterns of partisanship be considered against the backdrop of 
national political competition and other variations among countries. Parties can 
be interpreted as competing in a political marketplace for votes (Kitschelt 1994). 
The choices voters make remain constrained by the positions and candidates that 
the parties choose to offer. Increasingly, metropolitanisation has shaped this dual 
logic of partisan competition. Each of the main party families in developed and 
transitional democracies has found strongholds of support in specific types of 
metropolitan places. Despite the large differences between national party 
systems, a consistent metropolitan political ecology comprises part of the 
genealogical make-up of each party family.
14
 
The eleven countries of the dataset encompass a wide variety of national 
party systems, and reflect diverse national trends in contemporary electoral 
competition. The cross-sectional variations exemplify how the fortunes of 
different parties have fluctuated over time. The sample includes countries with, 
at the time of study, left overall majorities at the national level (Sweden, 
Germany, the UK and Poland), one country with a mixed left majority (the 
Czech Republic), one country with a mixed right majority (Switzerland), three 
countries with a right majority (France, Spain and Israel), and two countries 
(Canada and the United States) where the majority shifted from centre-left to 
right over the period under study.  
Table 10: Voter support for parties, grouped by party families and 
ideological issue position indices (standardised by countries) in metropolitan 
municipalities: proportions of variance between countries, metropolitan 
areas and municipalities (ANOVA) 
Voter support 
Percentage of variance between … 
Countries 
Metropolitan 
areas 
Municipalities/ 
Communities 
Far left parties (6/11 countries) 47% 14% 39% 
Green parties (8/11 countries) 39% 14% 47% 
Center left parties (11/11 countries) 62% 12% 26% 
Center right parties (11/11 countries) 52% 19% 28% 
Market liberal parties (10/11 countries) 73% 10% 17% 
Far right parties (5/11 countries) 25% 31% 44% 
Regionalist and ethnic parties (3/11 countries) 15% 55% 30% 
 
Because of the distinctive origins and historical trajectories of national party 
systems, it should come as no surprise that the largest proportion of the variance 
in community support for most types of parties in our sample is explained by 
differences between countries (Table 10). The analysis of variance leaves equally 
little question, however, about the importance of variations within and between 
                                                 
14  Definitions of party families follow the classification scheme in Kriesi et al. (2008). See Table 
A1 in the appendix to this chapter. 
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metropolitan areas. Indeed, for parties of the far Left, and parties of the far Right, 
as well as ‘Green’ parties, regionalist and ethnic parties, support varies more at 
the subnational level than between countries. For any type of party except for 
regionalist and ethnic parties, local differences within metropolitan areas 
comprise the greatest source of subnational variation. These municipal-level 
differences make up between 17 per cent and 47 per cent of the overall variance. 
While local variations are especially decisive for the far Left, the far Right and 
the Greens, they still represent over a quarter of the overall variance in support 
for the Centre Left and Centre Right, and about thirty per cent of the variance in 
regionalist and ethnic party support. 
Table 11: Significant predictors of party voting in metropolitan 
municipalities/communities, by party family 
 Far Left Greens 
Moderate 
Left 
Market 
Liberal 
Moderat
e Right 
Far 
Right 
Metropolitan effects       
Airport passengers/year (metro) -  (-) +   
Metropolitan population (metro)   +  (-)  
Metropolitan affluence (metro)  + -    
Metropolitan polarisation (metro)     -  
Poor nonminority concentrations (metro) +     + 
Poor minority concentrations (metro)      + 
Municipal effects       
Urban concentrations (-) (+)    (-) 
Affluent suburbs - + - (+) + (-) 
Low density suburbs  - - - (+)  
Municipal population (log) +  +  (-)  
Poor nonminority suburbs + - + - - + 
Poor minority suburbs + - (+) (-) - (+) 
Maximum variance explained       
Local 17% 8% 35% 31% 35% 31% 
Overall 48% 19% 49% 35% 18% 45% 
Note: Positive and negative signs represent direction of significant direct effects. Parentheses 
indicate significance in linear but not full equations. Boldface indicates p<.01; otherwise p<.05. 
 
Analysis of the metropolitan and local influences on the performance of party 
families reveals a clear relationship between each type of party and specific types 
of metropolitan places (Table 11).
15
 The most consistent bases of metropolitan 
                                                 
15  As in the analysis of voter turnout, a series of three-level regression models compared the effects 
of variables at national, metropolitan influences on the performance of each type of party family 
in those countries where it had established a national presence. The regressions for each party 
began with linear baseline models, followed by models that incorporated cross-level influences 
selected through backwards regressions. Although small samples of countries limited the 
reliability of inferences at the country level, the models included controls for dominance of the 
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support appear among the long established parties of the moderate Left and the 
far Left. Moderate Left parties rely on support from larger communities, poor 
suburbs and larger metropolitan areas in general. They perform consistently less 
well in affluent and low-density suburbs. In more affluent metropolitan areas as 
well as those with stronger relations to the global economy, support for the 
moderate Left has lagged. 
The smaller far Left parties have also performed better in poorer and more 
urbanised communities, but their profile most closely follows patterns of 
economic disadvantage. Poorer metropolitan areas with fewer minorities, as well 
as metropolitan areas less integrated into the global economy, generally provide 
stronger support for the far Left. At the local level, support for these parties has 
concentrated in poorer, more densely populated communities, and outside 
affluent suburbs and metropolitan urban centres.  
The newer family of Green parties, born of post-industrial cleavages that 
first emerged in the 1970s, has grown to occupy a distinctive metropolitan niche. 
Although largely an urban party like their counterparts on the Left, with little 
basis of support in low density suburbs, the Greens have thrived most in centres 
of educational and administrative services and high tech employment (Sellers 
1998). They have received much of their support from urban centres, especially 
the cores of the largest metropolitan areas, and in affluent suburbs only 
occasionally won by the moderate Left. They have also won a larger share of the 
vote in metropolitan areas with larger proportions of affluent and middle class 
communities, where the moderate Left has consistently underperformed. 
On the Right, there are fairly consistent metropolitan patterns of support. 
Moderate Right and Market Liberal parties, which have been the greatest 
proponents of neoliberal policies, rely most consistently on affluent suburbs for 
support. Both are least likely to receive support from poor suburbs. There and in 
less diverse, less polarised metropolitan areas, moderate Right parties have 
performed worst. They have also underperformed in more populous localities 
and metropolitan areas. While low-density suburbs are more likely to vote for 
Moderate Right parties, they are less likely to vote for Market Liberals. The 
latter gather more of the vote among the more urbanised constituencies and in 
more globally connected metropolitan areas.  
Meanwhile, recently established far Right parties like the National Front of 
France, the Swiss People’s Party or the Swedish Democrats have built support 
around nationalist and often ethnocentric agendas. These appeals have gained the 
strongest support in communities and metropolitan areas with more marginal 
positions in the global economy. Support for the far Right concentrates among 
poor suburbs, especially those with fewer minorities, and is generally stronger 
among metropolitan areas with larger concentrations of these poor suburbs. It is 
significantly lower in urban centres as well as in affluent suburbs. 
                                                                                                              
Left or the Right in national elections, and for postcommunist or transitional democracies. 
Additional variables controlled for the local performance of other competing parties on the Left 
or the Right. 
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Metropolitan sources of left-right voting 
The overall consequences of metropolitan political divisions can be gauged more 
systematically by means of the partisan ideological indices constructed in each 
country for each metropolitan locality. These indices employed partisan voting 
and the ideological preferences expressed by supporters for each party in 
national surveys to estimate the ideological ‘centre of gravity’ for each locality in 
the study (Gross and Sigelman 1984).  
Figure 5: Party support in metropolitan communities of eleven countries, 
measured by party voters’ left-right self-placement, by types of 
municipalities (mean values and 95% confidence intervals) 
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First, an index based on the self-placement of voters for each of the parties in 
contemporaneous surveys enabled an analysis of where each locality stands on 
the left right spectrum. Second, three additional ideological indices were 
constructed using the issue positions of party voters on a pre-defined range of 
issues: 1) political-economic (state-centred vs. market-centred economic 
policies), 2) socio-cultural (cultural conservatism vs. social liberalism), and 3) 
globalisation and cosmopolitanism (openness to immigration and trade, vs. 
nationalism and ethnocentrism).
16
 These indices provide a more in-depth analysis 
of the distinct dimensions of partisanship and ideology. 
                                                 
16  The procedure for defining these ideological indices is described in the country chapters of 
Sellers et al. (2013) and summarised in the methodological appendix to this paper. Positive 
coefficients in these models for each index indicate a more conservative position, and negative 
coefficients greater support for the Left. As we are more interested in variation between 
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Analysis of voter self-placement on the standard left-right scale highlights 
many of the most important general findings from the country studies (Figure 5). 
Across the whole range of countries, distinct partisan cleavages are articulated 
among different types of metropolitan places. Regardless of the electoral 
outcome, urban centres and poor minority suburbs give stronger support to the 
Left than do other suburban places. In each country, the affluent and low-density 
suburbs harbour the strongest support for the Right. Middle class suburbs stand 
between these other types. They have consistently voted more for the Right than 
the urban concentrations, but more for the Left than either the low density or the 
affluent suburbs.  
Multi-level analysis of the full dataset generally confirms these patterns 
(Table 12). A variable for the log of population demonstrates a strong, consistent 
relationship between size and Left support, as does the dichotomous variable for 
poor minority suburbs. Affluent suburbs clearly maintain consistent bases of 
support for the Right.
17
 
The multilevel analysis also reveals a number of significant predictors at 
wider scales. Greater integration of a metropolitan area into the global capitalist 
economy, measured here by the number of airport passengers
18
, generally works 
to the advantage of the Right (see model 1). As the model with cross-level 
interaction terms (Model 2) shows, this effect also varies by type of locality. 
Larger metropolitan localities in more globalised metropolitan settings vote 
significantly less strongly for the Left. Low-density suburbs there give less 
support to the Right.  
A second set of multilevel influences stem from metropolitan settlement 
structures. Larger metropolitan areas and countries with more metropolitan 
patterns of settlement have experienced deeper ideological divides among 
different types of metropolitan communities. Larger metropolitan areas generally 
provide greater support for the Left. Poor minority suburbs in these settings give 
the Left even stronger support, while low-density suburbs there align more 
strongly with the Right.  
Greater ethnic and income diversity at the metropolitan scale may mitigate 
the consequences of the deepening divides that metropolitanisation generally 
brings. Socio-spatial polarisation in a metropolitan area, a contextual feature 
related to aggregate ethnic and socio-economic diversity, exerts contrasting 
effects to those of other metropolitan variables. Low-density suburbs in spatially 
polarised settings give less support to the Right, while the Leftist orientation in 
poor suburbs stands out less.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                              
municipalities and metropolitan areas, rather than countries, all four indices have been 
standardised at the country level, thereby setting the variance between countries to zero. 
17  In models without the variable for size, urban concentrations emerged as a significant predictor 
of voting for the Left and low density suburbs as a predictor of voting for the Right. 
18  Alternative measures for the number of international passengers, the volume of freight, and the 
volume of international freight generated similar results. 
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Table 12: Multi-level regression analysis of party support in metro-politan 
municipalities (left-right self-placement index and economic index) 
  
Party self-
placement 
(Crosslevel 
effects) 
Economic 
index 
(Crosslevel 
effects) 
  B t B t B t B t 
Intercept 1.14 1.31 0.44 0.49 0,06 0,07 0,34 0,42 
Metropolitan effects 
        Sociospatial polarisation (metro) 0.10 0.27 -0.02 -0.07 -0,25 -0,75 -0,38 -1,16 
Airport passengers/year (metro) 0.07 2.86 0.06 2.50 0,07 3,32 0,07 3,17 
Metropolitan population (metro) -0.33 -1.98 -0.21 -1.20 -0,18 -1,25 -0,25 -1,61 
Metropolitan affluence (metro) 0.24 1.08 0.26 1.16 0,73 3,66 0,80 4,02 
Municipal and crosslevel effects 
        Urban concentrations -0.16 -1.10 -0.14 -1.02 -0,02 -0,11 3,02 4,05 
Metropolitanisation (country) 
      
-0,01 -2,29 
Metropolitan population (metro) 
     
-0,36 -2,94 
Affluent suburbs 0.28 4.67 0.32 6.51 0,51 5,65 -0,66 -1,50 
Right wins (country) 
      
0,40 4,87 
Postcommunist (country) 
  
-0.30 -2.23 
    Metropolitan population (metro) 
     
0,21 2,96 
Metropolitan affluence (metro) 
      
-0,36 -1,93 
Low density suburbs 0.09 0.99 -0.78 -2.20 0,05 0,56 -1,13 -3,04 
Postcommunist (country) 
  
-0.52 -4.05 
    Metropolitanisation (country) 
  
0.01 2.31 
  
0,01 3,50 
Metropolitan polarisation (metro) 
 
-0.39 -1.95 
  
-0,54 -2,98 
Airport passengers/year (metro) 
  
-0.02 -2.03 
    Metropolitan population (metro) 
 
0.14 2.07 
  
0,12 1,90 
Municipal population (log) -0.23 -6.35 0.65 1.77 -0,14 -1,54 -0,24 -2,09 
Metropolitan polarisation (metro)  
 
0.35 1.97 
    Airport passengers/year (metro) 
  
0.03 2.51 
  
0,03 2,45 
Metropolitan population (metro) 
 
-0.20 -2.86 
    Poor nonminority suburbs -0.09 -1.62 -0.98 -4.37 -0,21 -4,73 0,59 1,14 
Right wins (country) 
  
0.37 4.23 
    Metropolitanization (country) 
  
0.01 2.52 
  
0,01 2,29 
Metropolitan polarisation (metro) 
 
0.76 2.88 
    Airport passengers/year (metro) 
      
0,05 3,37 
Metropolitan population (metro) 
     
-0,25 -2,56 
Poor nonminority concentrations (metro)   -0.63 -3.65 
    Poor minority suburbs -0.56 -3.00 4.15 7.98 -0,38 -3,47 2,46 3,57 
Metropolitanisation (country) 
  
-0.03 -5.77 
    Metropolitan polarisation (metro) 
 
1.01 1.94 
    Metropolitan population (metro)  
 
-0.48 -5.65 
  
-0,46 -4,12 
Log likelihood -14438 -14365 -14736 -14708 
Reliability:  Level one 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 
Level two 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.04 
Variance explained 
    Local 18% 19% 21% 21% 
Metropolitan 3% 5% 14% 15% 
Total 12% 13% 19% 19% 
Deviance 28876 28731 29472 29415 
Estimated parameters 42 88 42 85 
N 12843 12843 12797 12797 
Note: Coefficients are full maximum likelihood estimates in HLM3 module of HLM.  
For italicized coefficients, p<.10; for boldface coefficients, p<.05.  
Due to the standardisation of the dependent variable around the mean for each country, linear 
country variables were insignificant and are not shown here. 
 
Alongside these metropolitan influences, the multivariate tests of the country 
chapters in Sellers et al. (2013) reveal an array of local effects. These patterns 
represent far more than a reflection of the social and economic composition of 
these places (Table 13), and differ substantially between older and younger 
capitalist democracies. In Western Europe and North America, where 
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metropolitanisation is most advanced, population density emerges as one of the 
most consistent predictors of voting for the Left. Homeownership also exerts 
clear, consistent effects. In every country where this variable was tested except 
for Israel, where distinct historical conditions apply, communities with more 
homeowners gave significantly greater support to the Right.  
Table 13: Significant predictors of voter self-placement in metropolitan 
municipalities/communities, by country: overview from country 
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Winning 
parties in 
study period 
Mixed 
Mixed/ 
Right 
Left Right Mixed Left Mixed Left Left 
Mixed/ 
Right 
Right/ 
Centre 
Compositional variables at local-community level 
Socio-
economic 
status 
+ + + 
+ 
(income) 
-  
(educ.) 
(+) - + + 0 + - 
Hardship 
index 
- 0 - 0 0 0 - n.a. - - n.a. 
Foreign born 
residents 
- 0 0 (+) + 0 + 0 n.a. 0 0 
Old residents 0 (+) + + 0 0 + 0 n.a. (+) 0 
Young 
residents 
n.a. 0 + n.a. 0 + 0 0 n.a. (+) - 
Contextual variables at local-community level 
Homeowner-
ship 
+ 0 + + + n.a. n.a. + n.a. + 0 
Residential 
stability 
- (-) (-) - 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. n.a. 
Out-
commuting 
(-) (-) n.a. - 0 0 - 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Population 
size 
0 n.a. n.a. n.a. - 0 - 0 + + - 
Population 
density 
- (-) - - 0 - 0 0 0 n.a. 0 
Economic 
diversity 
+ 0 0 0 0 0 - n.a. n.a. 0 n.a. 
Notes: + = positive relation to right self-placement; - = positive relation to left self-placement; 
0 = no significant relation to left-right self-placement; n.a. = relation not tested in country study. 
Parentheses indicate significance in some but not all models. 
 
Wherever metropolitanisation has absorbed the majority of the electorate into 
extended urban regions, distinct spatial cleavages have emerged. The Right has 
drawn new support from voters with interests and orientations rooted in suburban 
localities of homeowners, low density settlement, concentrated privilege, and 
links to the international marketplace. These are the metropolitan bastions of 
neoliberalism within the contemporary capitalist city. In eight of the eleven 
countries, communities with higher overall socio-economic status or income vote 
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more for the Right. In seven of eleven, communities containing more seniors also 
disproportionately support the Right. 
In contrast, the Left has drawn support from both larger urbanised places 
and those with more renters, smaller families and more young adults. Although 
socio-economic composition often proves multicollinear with contextual 
differences, it remains a major source of the intra-metropolitan variation. 
Minority or immigrant concentrations vote Left with some degree of consistency 
(in eight of the eleven countries), and in every country except Germany, 
communities with greater socio-economic hardship vote significantly more to the 
Left (Table 13).  
Patterns in the two newer democracies of post-communist Europe, the 
Czech Republic and Poland, differ from those in the other countries. In these 
countries, population density (and city size) predicts stronger support for the 
Right rather than the Left. State socialism there long prevented the emergence of 
housing markets outside the urban centres. As a result, metropolitanisation and 
suburban low-density settlement remain more limited than in older capitalist 
democracies. Within both party systems, legacies from the postcommunist 
transition have also produced a distinctive relationship between the economic 
and other dimensions of partisan ideology (Kreuzer and Pattai 2004). The 
resulting menu of partisan choices has enabled Czech and Polish cities to 
embrace marketisation, cultural liberalism and cosmopolitanism at the same 
time. 
Metropolitan influences on the dimensions of partisanship 
As much of the literature on partisan competition since the 1970s in Western 
Europe has demonstrated, political parties no longer position themselves solely 
in relation to a unidimensional left-right scale. Increasingly, cultural issues 
(Kitschelt 1994) and questions related to globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006; Kriesi 
et al. 2008) now supplement longstanding economic questions about the relations 
between state and market as the defining issues in elections. For societies outside 
the developed West, the multidimensional character of partisan competition has 
been even more evident (Kreuzer and Pattai 2004). Three indices reveal how the 
partisan preferences of voters reflect positions on major dimensions of ideology 
(Figure 6; see methodological appendix to this volume for more details). The 
economic index captures issues directly linked to policy regarding the state and 
markets, including distributive questions about the welfare state. The socio-
cultural index derives from questions about domestic cultural issues, such as 
religion, gender and familial authority. The globalisation index encompasses a 
broad range of issues linked to the general difference between cosmopolitanism 
and ethno-nationalism. Although items in this last index overlap with cultural 
and economic issues, the index focuses solely on matters that are international in 
scope or that concern immigration and racial diversity.
19
 
                                                 
19  As the indexes for different countries have in some instances employed different survey 
questions, comparison of the results requires caution about setting index values for each country 
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Figure 6: Party support in metropolitan communities of eleven countries, 
measured by party voter’s position on issues related to economic policies, 
globalisation, as well as cultural issues by type of municipalities (issue 
indices standardised by country, mean values and 95% confidence intervals) 
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Notes: ♦ Economic index, ■ Cultural index, ▲ Globalisation index 
The dimension of economic ideology 
One of the most direct ways that metropolitanisation has created new bases of 
support for neoliberalism stems from economic interests in assets and 
consumption patterns linked to the places where metropolitan residents live 
(Sellers and Walks 2013). In densely populated urban settings, as in the 
traditional industrial city, economies of scale and proximity as well as limited 
property assets give residents more reason to support the collective provision of 
services by the welfare state. Suburban communities, by contrast, depend more 
on private property and individualised modes of service provision. As a result, 
residents of these communities look more to the markets and private solutions 
that are a hallmark of neoliberal ideology. Affluent or middle class and lower-
density suburban communities with more property assets, fewer opportunities for 
collective provision, and greater capacities for purchasing private services should 
be more prone toward neoliberal economic orientations (Dunleavy 1979; Walks 
2006). 
The index based on the economic ideology of party voters offers a 
calibrated test of these effects. As the discussion in the country chapters of 
                                                                                                              
directly alongside each other. For this reason, the pooled analysis again centres the sub-national 
variation in each index around the national mean values. 
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Sellers et al. (2013) has shown, this index captures widespread opposition 
between support for markets and support for the welfare state. The typology of 
metropolitan localities provides a general view of the ways that similar types of 
municipalities compare in different countries (Figure 6). Multilevel analysis 
enables us to test the patterns systematically, and to compare variance in the 
economic index with the overall variations in voter self-placement on the left-
right scale (Table 12, models 3 and 4). 
The hypotheses about pro market orientations apply most clearly to affluent 
and middle class suburbs. As measured by the beta coefficients, affluent suburbs 
support pro-market parties nearly twice as strongly as they identify with the 
Right on the ideological scale. Beyond this, the more affluent and middle class 
suburbs dominate a metropolitan area, the stronger the average metropolitan 
support for market-friendly policies and parties. In accordance with expectations 
about the effects from increasing metropolitanisation, support for pro-market 
parties among affluent suburbs is especially pronounced in larger metropolitan 
areas. Where parties of the Right have consistently won, moreover, these parties 
have performed especially well in the affluent suburbs.
20
 
The multilevel models also largely confirm the findings of numerous 
country chapters in Sellers et al. (2013) that support for welfare-statist parties 
concentrates in the urban centres that also usually serve as centres of 
metropolitan public service provision. The effect attains statistical significance in 
larger metropolitan areas and in countries with higher rates of 
metropolitanisation. Everywhere but in Poland, the Czech Republic and Israel, 
urban centres vote more strongly for welfare-statist parties than the metropolitan 
average. In the U.S., Canada and Switzerland, urban centres give stronger 
average support to pro-welfare state parties than do poor suburbs.  
In mature developed economies, more sprawling metropolitan settlement 
clearly contributes to political support for neoliberal parties. The higher the 
national level of metropolitanisation, the more low-density suburbs vote for these 
parties. Smaller metropolitan municipalities also disproportionately support pro-
market parties, once effects from global connectivity are controlled for. The 
country chapters show these effects to operate independently of the 
consequences from socioeconomic status, and to go beyond the occupational 
interests that have preoccupied theories of nationalisation and modernisation. In 
metropolitanised countries, numerous contextual variables linked to suburban 
lifestyles also predict stronger support for neoliberal policies:  
 
- Homeownership or single family houses (in France, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States); 
- Lower density or population size (in France, Germany, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States); 
- Housing or population growth (in Canada, Germany, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States);  
                                                 
20  In an intriguing exception to this relationship, the relation between metropolitan affluence and 
pro-market voting is reversed in affluent suburbs. 
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- Residential mobility (in Canada, France and the United States); and 
- Commuting or driving to work (in Canada and the United States). 
 
Each type of poor suburbs supports parties with more welfare-statist orientations. 
In both types of poor communities, these statist orientations increase with the 
size of metropolitan areas. In more metropolitanised countries, however, the 
private property and private amenities of suburban places alter these effects. As 
the positive cross-level coefficient for these national contexts shows, many poor 
non-minority suburbs also harbour strong neoliberal countercurrents.  
At the metropolitan scale, connectivity to the global economy, as well as 
overall affluence, strengthens support for pro-market parties.
21
 In metropolitan 
areas favoured by the globalised market economy, and in places with the more 
privatised suburban lifestyles, neoliberal leanings are strongest. In the most 
urbanised communities at or near the metropolitan core, interests in collective 
consumption and redistribution contribute to welfare-statist orientations.  
In the two postcommunist countries and in the distinctive metropolitan 
context of Israel, central cities remain bastions of neoliberal support. Here, and 
to a lesser degree in such Western European countries as France and Sweden, the 
continued attraction of urban centres for economic elites has altered the 
predominant patterns. Although class and demography remain of utmost 
importance to these patterns, they do not wholly dictate them. Suburban 
neoliberalism and the ideological polarisation surrounding it are thus also partly 
consequences of the differential effects of place. 
The cultural dimension  
Contrasts between liberalism and conservatism in the social and culture sphere 
also play an important role in producing and defining metropolitan political 
cleavages. The index to test this dimension of partisan ideological competition 
generally captured preferences related to traditional attitudes toward religion, 
gender and parental authority.
22
 By and large, the socio-cultural dimension of 
political differences among localities reinforces the economic one (Table 14). To 
focus analysis on how the two dimensions differ, our modeling of the culture 
index included the values of the economic policy index as an independent 
variable (Table 14). These models therefore test whether the value of the socio-
cultural index for each type of community stands to the Right (positive) or the 
Left (negative) of its position on the economic index. 
                                                 
21  This result is consistent with previous analyses of how favourable economic prospects in a 
globalised economy promote stronger market orientations among private professional workers 
(e.g. Kitschelt 1994). The territorial effect, however, suggests that perceptions of economic 
advantages from global connections extend beyond occupational or class effects. The cross-level 
model shows (model 4) that global connectivity of a metropolitan area fosters pro-market 
orientations particularly in larger municipalities and in poor nonminority suburbs. 
22  Unfortunately, insufficient data for our eleven countries did not allow us to examine in sufficient 
detail the materialism/post-materialism aspects of socio-cultural changes in this cross-national 
study. This remains an objective of future analyses. 
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Values of the economic index account for nearly half (48 %) of the 
variation in socio-cultural orientations. In countries with high rates of 
metropolitanisation, and where the Right has dominated national elections, the 
correspondence between the two dimensions is the strongest. By comparison 
with economic ideology, analyses of the country chapters suggest somewhat less 
consistent metropolitan spatial patterns in the cultural index. However, several 
significant divergences also set the socio-cultural dimension of metropolitan 
political ecology apart from the economic dimension.  
One of the most striking contrasts appears in the most educated, highest 
income communities. In the affluent suburbs, comparatively liberal social and 
cultural attitudes accompany pro-market policy preferences. In ten of eleven 
countries, these suburbs average less socio-cultural conservatism than economic 
conservatism (Figure 6) (and in eight, such differences are significant at the 95% 
confidence level). The tendency is especially pronounced in the post-communist 
countries. As the multivariate tests presented in the country chapters of Sellers et 
al. (2013) confirmed, communities with higher socioeconomic status in 
Germany, Switzerland, the Czech Republic and Poland have voted more strongly 
for pro-market policy platforms than for cultural conservatism. 
The socio-cultural dimension also reinforces the advantage of the Left in its 
urbanised strongholds. Post-materialist orientations in these settings comprise 
part of the challenge to traditional cultural values (Sellers and Walks 2013). In 
the pooled analysis, significant urban support for the Left emerges along the 
cultural dimension, even when it does not appear along the economic one (Table 
14). In larger metropolitan areas and in countries where the Left has consistently 
won majorities, this relationship is significantly stronger. 
Among the poor suburbs that support the Left along the economic 
dimension, the analysis confirms a tendency for the cultural dimension to 
undermine Left support. A cultural divide separates these suburbs from both the 
urban centres and the affluent suburbs. Poor suburbs generally support more 
conservative positions on the socio-cultural dimension than on the economic one 
(Figure 6). In every country but the United States, Canada and Sweden, the 
difference for at least one type of poor suburb exceeds the range between 
confidence intervals (Figure 6). The pooled regressions confirm this relationship 
for poor nonminority suburbs in countries where metropolitanisation is furthest 
advanced.
23
 
Compared with the economic dimension, salience for the cultural dimension 
may give the Right a slight net advantage in metropolitan voting. Where the 
Right has dominated national elections, cross-level interactions with the 
economic index show that cultural conservatism has averaged significantly 
higher. Low density suburbs also swing significantly conservative along the 
cultural dimension, once a cross-level variable controls for Right majorities.  
                                                 
23  A similar tendency among poor minority suburbs falls just short of statistical significance 
(p<.10), except in metropolitan areas with larger proportions of poor nonminority suburbs. 
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Table 14: Multi-level regression analysis of party support (cultural index and globalisation indexes) in metropolitan 
municipalities  
 Cultural index (Crosslevel effects) Globalisation index (Crosslevel effects) (With ethnic diversity) 
 B t B t B t B t B t 
Intercept 0.93 1.12 0.89 1.06 1.50 1.59 1.18 1.21 1.18 1.21 
Metropolitan effects           
Socio-spatial polarisation (metro) 0.06 0.17 -0.07 -0.18 0.69 1.73 0.74 1.86 0.70 1.76 
Airport passengers/year (metro) 0.03 1.46 0.03 1.45 0.04 1.80 0.04 1.81 0.04 1.79 
Metropolitan population (metro) -0.28 -1.75 -0.25 -1.59 -0.33 -1.85 -0.27 -1.45 -0.27 -1.43 
Metropolitan affluence (metro) 0.36 1.63 0.40 1.81 -0.28 -1.16 -0.22 -0.92 -0.24 -0.97 
Municipal and crosslevel effects           
Urban concentrations -0.11 -2.70 -0.11 -2.86 -0.13 -2.23 -0.15 -2.70 -0.15 -2.69 
Affluent suburbs -0.13 -4.21 -0.08 -2.41 -0.28 -3.24 0.31 1.47 0.28 1.35 
   Right wins (country)   -0.08 -2.42   -0.51 -10.71 -0.52 -11.01 
   Postcommunist (country)   -0.11 -1.91       
   Metropolitan population (metro)       -0.07 -2.11 -0.07 -1.97 
Low density suburbs 0.04 1.47 0.08 2.44 0.13 4.55 0.23 5.03 0.22 4.88 
   Right wins (country)   -0.11 -2.91       
   Airport passengers/year (metro)       -0.02 -2.89 -0.02 -2.79 
Municipal population -0.10 -1.87 0.21 1.43 -0.15 -2.55 0.65 2.56 0.66 2.63 
   Left wins (country)   -0.30 -6.58   -0.43 -4.40 -0.41 -4.20 
   Right wins (country)       -0.17 -3.56 -0.15 -3.15 
   Metropolitanisation (country)   0.00 1.96       
   Metropolitan polarisation (metro)   0.15 2.04       
   Metropolitan population (metro)   -0.08 -3.14   -0.11 -2.59 -0.11 -2.70 
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Table 14 continued 
 Cultural index (Crosslevel effects) Globalisation index (Crosslevel effects) (With ethnic diversity) 
 B t B t B t B t B t 
Poor nonminority suburbs 0.09 2.40 -0.11 -1.15 0.16 3.60 -1.00 -3.75 -0.95 -3.45 
   Metropolitanisation (country)   0.00 2.18       
   Airport passengers/year (metro)       -0.03 -3.58 -0.03 -3.47 
   Metropolitan population (log)           
Poor minority suburbs 0.18 1.93 0.16 1.49 0.03 0.38 0.89 2.57 1.05 3.01 
   Ethnic diversity (country)         -0.79 -2.44 
   Poor nonminority concentrations (metro)   0.34 2.89       
   Metropolitan polarisation (metro)       0.67 1.90 0.84 2.28 
   Metropolitan population (metro)       -0.18 -3.16 -0.18 -3.11 
Economic ideology 0.52 4.03 -0.43 -2.04 0.34 2.93 -0.43 -2.62 -0.48 -2.81 
   Right wins (country)   0.57 6.69       
   Left wins (country)       -0.54 -4.70 -0.56 -4.71 
   Metropolitanisation (country)   0.01 4.87   0.02 6.96 0.02 7.02 
   Metropolitan polarisation (metro)   -0.19 -1.90       
   Metropolitan affluence (metro)       -0.19 -2.47 -0.20 -2.48 
Log likelihood -1686 -1660 -11503 -11524 -11525 
Reliability: Level one 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 
   Level two 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.08 
Variance explained      
   Local 89% 89% 42% 42% 42% 
   Metropolitan 0% 0% 4% 4% 4% 
Deviance 3371 3320 23007 23048 23050 
   Estimated parameters 89 100 142 102 103 
N 12814 12814 12813 12813 12813 
Notes: Coefficients are full maximum likelihood estimates in HLM3 module of HLM. For italicized coefficients, p<.10; for boldface coefficients, p<.05.  
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Due to the standardisation of the dependent variable around the mean for each country, linear country variables were insignificant and are not shown here. 
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Among the most metropolitanised countries, lower density also emerged as the 
most consistent contextual predictor of cultural conservatism (in France, 
Germany, Switzerland, the United States, and at the metropolitan level in 
Canada). 
Metropolitan differences over cultural issues both reinforce and modify the 
effects of the divisions linked to economic ideology. Cultural liberalism has 
furnished the Left with bases of urban support that welfare statism does not, and 
enabled it to make inroads into some affluent suburbs. Cultural traditionalism has 
strengthened support for the Right in low density suburbs and beyond, and 
eroded support for the Left in poor non-minority suburbs.  
The globalisation dimension  
Rather than values linked to traditional culture, it is globalisation that marks the 
clearest new dimension of metropolitan cleavages that cross-cut economic 
ideology. Here the index incorporates a wide range of issues that partly overlap 
with both economic ideologies and traditional social values. The common thread 
among the issues in this index is attitudes toward diversity and cosmopolitanism, 
as expressed in opinions about international institutions and influences, 
immigration and multiculturalism. In the coding scheme, low values indicate 
cosmopolitanism and higher values ethno-nationalism.
24
 Because the established 
Right and Left parties often maintain similar positions on these issues, voting for 
such parties on the Right as the French National Front and the Swiss People’s 
Party, and such parties on the Left as the French Communists and the Greens, 
exert disproportionate influence on this index.  
The Globalisation Index captures a distinct geography of ideological 
variation from either the socio-cultural values or economic ideology. The 
economic index accounts for less than one quarter (24 %) of the variation in 
positions related to globalisation, only half the variation in cultural attitudes.
25
 
Compared with economic issues, emphasis on issues surrounding globalisation 
may provide a diffuse advantage to the Left similar to the effects of cultural 
issues for the Right. The negative cross-level interactions between effects from 
the local economic index and national Left majorities indicate stronger Left 
support along the globalisation dimension, and contrast with the positive cross-
level interactions in the opposite direction in the models for the cultural index. In 
more metropolitanised countries, however, neoliberal economic ideologies 
predict even stronger ethno-nationalism. This effect is even greater than the 
impact on cultural conservatism.  
                                                 
24  Comparative data for all eleven countries did not enable precise tests of the territorial effects 
from industrial and occupational restructuring hypothesised in Table 1.5 of the introduction 
(Sellers and Walks 2013). However, it is likely that our measures for metropolitan size, affluence 
and global connectivity partly capture effects from occupational clustering. Affluent and globally 
connected metropolitan regions contain bigger post-industrial private business sectors. These 
sectors may help to account for more cosmopolitan, culturally liberal and neoliberal orientations 
there, especially in affluent suburbs. 
25  Correspondence with the economic index ranges higher in more metropolitanised countries, but 
lower in more affluent metropolitan areas (Table 14, models 4 and 5). 
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Contrasts in wider regional and metropolitan contexts largely shape support 
for cosmopolitanism and ethno-nationalism. Overall, both global connectivity 
and metropolitan polarisation and diversity are linked to slightly higher 
metropolitan levels of ethno-nationalism (p<.10). In localities where economic 
preferences are more statist, however, metropolitan affluence generally fosters 
stronger cosmopolitanism. In countries as diverse as Israel, the United States, 
France and Poland, the largest, richest and best educated metropolitan regions 
have generally given stronger support to more cosmopolitan parties. Among 
urban concentrations, larger localities, and poor minority suburbs, metropolitan 
size has parallel cosmopolitan effects. Global connectivity reinforces 
cosmopolitanism in outlying low density suburbs and poor nonminority suburbs, 
but has a contrary effect among poor minority suburbs. The country chapters in 
Sellers et al. (2013) also point to a variety of more specific regional effects.
26
 
Within metropolitan areas, the patterns are broadly consistent with the 
hypotheses of Sellers and Walks (2013) about the place effects of diversity.
27
 
Larger places generally expose residents to more diversity, and the larger 
municipalities clearly support cosmopolitanism. This support is especially 
pronounced in larger metropolitan areas, and in countries where the Left has 
dominated national elections. Urban concentrations also support 
cosmopolitanism just as strongly as they do cultural liberalism. In every country 
except Spain, these places vote more cosmopolitan than most suburbs. However, 
urban cores are not the only territorial sources of cosmopolitan voting. 
Coefficients for the affluent suburbs demonstrate more than twice as strong an 
effect on the globalisation index (B=-.28, p=.01) as on the cultural index (B=-
.13, p<.01). In eight of the eleven countries, these suburbs give stronger average 
support to cosmopolitanism than they do to neoliberalism (Figure 6). As the 
cross level effects demonstrate, the effect concentrates in larger metropolitan 
areas and in those countries where the Right has consistently won national 
majorities.  
At the opposite end of the spectrum, ethno-nationalism demonstrates greater 
strength in the metropolitan places most distant from urban concentrations and 
minority concentrations. Low density suburbs give stronger, more consistent 
support to ethno-nationalist parties than they do to cultural traditionalist ones. 
Ethno-nationalist leanings characterise these suburbs in every country except 
Israel, where social geographies of the outlying suburban areas reflect the 
distinctive history of Palestinian and Israeli settlement.  
The majority in poor or poor nonminority suburbs typically retains some 
distance from minorities and immigrants, but may face competition with these 
groups for employment and services. In the multilevel models the coefficient for 
                                                 
26  Border regions of France, as well as Jerusalem in Israel, smaller metropolitan regions in Poland, 
Malmö and Stockholm in Sweden, and central and southern regions of the United States, harbour 
more ethno-nationalist preferences. 
27  Due to data unavailability for all metropolitan areas and localities, tests of these hypotheses were 
confined to cross-sectional local and national variations. Full testing would require analysis of 
metropolitan and regional effects, as well as longitudinal data on patterns of immigrant 
settlement. 
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these suburbs indicates a stronger relation to ethno-nationalist preferences 
(B=0.16, p<.01) than to traditionalism (B=0.09, p<.05).
28
 In all eleven countries, 
ethno-nationalist preferences in these suburbs averaged higher on a standardised 
scale than neoliberal preferences. In six of the eleven countries the margin 
between the two indexes exceeded a 95 per cent confidence interval. Location in 
more globally connected metropolitan regions reverses this relationship, 
suggesting that the effects of globalisation are indeed multi-scalar.. Meanwhile, 
inconsistent relationships with ethno-nationalism among poor suburbs with 
concentrations of ethnic minorities suggest important interdependencies between 
national and local contexts.
29
 
Orientations toward globalisation and multiculturalism bring out a separate 
dimension of partisan competition rooted in distinctive metropolitan divisions. 
This dimension has reinforced and broadened electoral advantages for 
cosmopolitan Left parties like the Greens in urbanised communities and in 
larger, more affluent, and in some respects more globalised metropolitan areas. 
In affluent suburbs, cosmopolitan parties have found new support. Among low 
density and suburbs and in less globalised metropolitan areas and regions, 
salience for this dimension has strengthened support for the Right. In the poor 
suburbs, where economic affinities generally remain with the Left, ethno-
nationalist appeals have enabled the Right to make new inroads. 
Metropolitanisation of partisan cleavages and competition 
Throughout advanced industrial societies, and increasingly beyond them, the 
emerging context of metropolitan settlement has imposed a new political 
geography on partisan competition and ideology. Antiquated concepts like the 
urban-rural divide, or persistently relevant ones like social class, race and region, 
are inadequate to account for the resulting territorial lines of partisan 
competition. 
The previous chapters in this book have explained the patterns within each 
country more fully. The more predominant metropolitan settlement has become, 
and the larger the metropolitan area, the more these types have taken on 
characteristic ideologies and partisan orientations (Table 15). 
The partisan indexes employed in this chapter offer the first comparative 
transnational overview of these widespread new patterns of partisan allegiances. 
The consistent metropolitan patterns that emerged from the country chapters of 
                                                 
28  In four countries (Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Israel), ethno-nationalism in these 
suburbs averaged stronger than cultural traditionalism. 
29  Ethnic and racial diversity (measured here by the Fearon-Laitin index of ethnic fractionalization) 
contributes in specific settings to cosmopolitan attitudes. In countries with greater levels of 
fractionalization, such as Canada and the U.S., poor minority suburbs provide greater support to 
cosmopolitan parties (Model 5). Along with the effects hypothesised by Sellers and Walks (this 
volume), this effect may stem from the greater weight of poor minorities themselves in the local 
electorate of more diverse countries. In less fractionalised countries such as France or Sweden, 
the stronger ethno-nationalist voting in the same type of suburbs probably reflects a backlash 
among the larger native ethnic majority. Smaller minorities also help to account for the positive 
relationship between minorities or immigrants and ethno-nationalist voting in countries such as 
the Czech Republic, Germany and Poland. 
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Sellers et al. (2013) are unmistakable here. The rise of the Far Right in poor and 
low density suburbs and poorer, smaller metropolitan areas has expanded 
territorial constituencies for the Right. Affluent, middle class and low density 
suburbs vote for Market Liberal and moderate right parties. More urbanised 
communities and poor minority suburbs vote for the Left. Beyond the traditional 
strongholds of the Left in poor communities, the Moderate Left and especially 
the Greens have established new electoral bases in urbanised areas and to a 
degree in affluent and middle class suburbs. Overall, metropolitan support for the 
Left ranges higher in the largest metropolitan areas, on one hand, and in those 
more sheltered from the global economy on the other.  
Table 15: Summary of selected results from pooled Multi-Level Regressions 
 TURNOUT LEFT-RIGHT INDEXES 
 Local National 
Self-
placement 
Economic Cultural** Globalization** 
Intrametropolitan 
Urban concentrations (UR)  Higher    Left Left 
Municipal size (SZ) 
Much 
Lower 
Much 
Lower 
Left   Left 
Poor minority suburbs (PM) Lower Lower Left Left (Right)  
Poor nonminority suburbs (PN)  Lower  Left Right Right 
Affluent suburbs (AF)  Higher Right Right Left Left 
Low density suburbs (LO) Higher Lower  Right  Right 
Metropolitan and related cross-level effects* 
Size (population, logged) (Lower)  Left  (Left) (Left) 
 UR+ 
AF+, 
LO+, PN- 
LO-R,  
SZ-R,  
PM-R 
UR-L,  
AF-R,  
LO-R,  
PN-L,  
PM-L 
SZ-L 
AF-L,  
PM-L 
Global connectivity --- --- Right Right  (Right) 
   
LO-R,  
SZ-L 
SZ-R,  
PN-R 
 
LO-L,  
PN-L 
Affluence    Right   
 UR+, SZ- UR+  AF-L   
Polarisation/diversity  Lower    (Right) 
 AF+ UR+, LO- 
LO-L,  
SZ-R,  
PN-R,  
PM-R 
LO-L SZ-R PM-R 
Country and related cross-level effects* 
Metropolitanisation   --- --- --- --- 
  
UR-, 
AF+, 
LO+, PM- 
LO-L,  
PN-R,  
PM-L 
UR-L,  
LO-R,  
PN-R 
SZ-R,  
PN-R 
 
Postcommunist/New democracies   --- --- --- --- 
   
AF-L,  
LO-L 
 (AF-L)  
Right wins --- --- --- --- --- --- 
   PN-R AF-R AF-L 
AF-L,  
SZ-L 
Left wins --- --- --- --- --- --- 
     SZ-L SZ-L 
Notes: * = Significant linear effects in first row, cross-level effects immediately below;  
** = Trends measured in relation to economic ideology. L = Favours Left; R = Favours Right; 
--- = not tested in models. Relationships in parentheses significant at p<.10;  
all other relationships significant at p<.05. 
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The country chapters of Sellers et al. (2013) demonstrated that these electoral 
patterns are linked to such contextual features of metropolitan places as urban 
density and homeownership, as well as class and demographic composition. 
Indices based on distinct ideological dimensions of partisan competition reveal 
significant variations in these metropolitan territorial effects. Juxtaposed with 
each other, and with the findings of consistent metropolitan differences in voter 
turnout, the indices expose the different strategic imperatives that the Left and 
the Right now face in their attempts to win the increasingly pivotal votes of 
metropolitan areas.  
All told, parties of Right stand to gain the most from the ongoing 
metropolitanisation of politics. The gains are especially apparent for the 
neoliberal agendas that have been adopted with enthusiasm by many parties. 
New sources of support for marketisation have emerged in affluent, middle class 
and low-density suburbs. The more globally connected and the more affluent a 
metropolitan area is, the stronger its ideological leaning toward neoliberal 
policies. Cultural conservatism has reinforced support for the Right in many 
suburbs and smaller metropolitan areas, and enabled it to make inroads into long-
time Leftist strongholds in poor nonminority suburbs. Ethno-nationalism, often 
fuelled by new Far Right parties, has enhanced and extended these bases of 
support. Along the globalisation dimension, the Right has won greater support 
among low-density suburbs and in more polarised, more diverse metropolitan 
areas. Along both dimensions these gains have come at the cost of losses among 
culturally liberal, cosmopolitan affluent suburbs and urban cores, and have occur 
despite counter-currents from the growing diversity and social complexity of 
metropolitan areas. 
For parties of the Left, metropolitanisation creates a more limited set of 
opportunities. Left parties supporting statist over neoliberal economic and social 
policies have drawn on bases of support that are increasingly inconsistent. Along 
the other dimensions of partisan competition, the Left faces trade-offs that mirror 
those of the Right. Green and other culturally liberal parties have established 
solid bases of support in urban concentrations, in the larger localities of larger, 
more diverse metropolitan areas, and in affluent suburbs. Cosmopolitanism has 
generally reinforced these strongholds. Gains in these areas for Left parties have 
come at the cost of losses to traditionalist parties in poor and middle class 
suburbs, and to ethno-nationalist parties in poor suburbs, low-density suburbs, 
and in polarised metropolitan areas more generally.  
Metropolitan patterns of electoral mobilisation have been even more 
decisive for the advantages of the Right. The affluent and middle class suburbs 
that have generally supported the Right turn out at the highest rates in national 
elections (Table 15). Among the large, urbanised communities where the Left 
has won support through cultural liberalism and cosmopolitanism, voter 
participation rates are consistently, and often dramatically lower than elsewhere. 
The persistent stronger electoral mobilisation among the suburban strongholds of 
the Right typically biases electoral results in its favour.  
Although parties of the Left can and do win metropolitan majorities, the 
electoral logic growing out of metropolitanisation has favoured a gradual drift 
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toward neoliberalism on the Left as well as the Right. Affluent and middle class 
suburbs, and metropolitan areas integrated into global markets, comprise an ever 
growing proportion of potential voters. The poor suburbs and urbanised 
communities that give the strongest support to welfare statist policies have 
mobilised much less than places supportive of neoliberalism. As the Left has 
turned to cultural liberalism and especially cosmopolitanism, it has found new 
bases of support among affluent suburbs, cosmopolitan urban concentrations and 
large metropolitan areas. Many of these places are precisely the metropolitan 
settings where support for neoliberalism tends to be strongest. Those that harbour 
more support for welfare statist policy, such as the urban concentrations, 
mobilise less in elections. Metropolitan trends have thus given the Left as well as 
the Right electoral incentives to turn to neoliberal agendas. As an influence on 
partisan orientations, on voter participation, and ultimately on electoral 
strategies, metropolitanisation is a pervasive driving force behind the rise and 
entrenchment of neoliberalism. 
Conclusion: Metropolitan sources of political behaviour 
In most advanced industrial societies, the growth of extended metropolitan 
regions into the predominant mode of settlement is already an established fact. 
The importance of these regions for economics and governance has increasingly 
become apparent. As the analyses of this book have demonstrated, 
metropolitanisation also has important consequences for political behaviour. 
Metropolitan contexts decisively shape both whether citizens exercise the most 
fundamental political right of modern democratic citizenship, and the ideological 
orientations they bring to this task. Especially in countries with metropolitan 
majorities, metropolitan patterns of local interests, institutions, and cultural 
orientations have replaced the urban-rural divide and the segmented regions of 
pre-industrial and industrial society with an increasingly pervasive new political 
geography. Instead of the national uniformity among places predicted by the 
nationalisation thesis, metropolitanisation has embedded entrenched, inter-
related divergences in local electoral behaviour.  
Analysis of voter turnout shows that differences in this most basic act of 
political participation vary in ways that trace to local and metropolitan sources. 
Examination of these patterns casts new light on the role of voter participation in 
the layered governance of contemporary societies, and in particular on the 
relation between local and national electoral mobilisation. In conjunction with 
national institutions, metropolitan and local political subcultures have produced 
sometimes dramatically divergent patterns of electoral participation within the 
same country or even the same region. In this dimension of political behaviour, 
the systematic local and regional variations that metropolitanisation has 
introduced clearly contradict the thesis of nationalisation. In some places, such as 
the peripheral towns of metropolitan Switzerland and France, metropolitan 
patterns perpetuate traditional localised practices of political participation. In 
other places, such as U.S. and Polish urban regions, metropolitan settlement has 
produced a variegated geography of de-localised participation. 
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Partisan cleavages reflect much more than divisions between social classes, 
urban and rural areas, or regional ethnic traditions. They are also a result of the 
consumption interests, assets, and cultural practices arising from, and located in, 
distinct types of metropolitan places, and the different positions of metropolitan 
economies in the global economy. Throughout the advanced industrial world, 
suburbanisation and the variable geometry of metropolitan economic advantage 
and disadvantage have been much more than products of neoliberalism. They are 
drivers of the political dynamics that have embedded neoliberalism in party 
platforms and public policy around the world. 
As a result of these trends, Left parties now often compete for national 
power on terms that tend to favour the Right. The affluent and middle class 
metropolitan strongholds of the Right make up growing proportions of national 
electorates. These places mobilise more consistently and more strongly than the 
more urbanised, more disadvantaged metropolitan strongholds of the Left. The 
sources of new support for the Left in urban concentrations and in affluent 
communities stem more from culturally liberal or cosmopolitan values than from 
opposition to marketisation or privatisation. Voters in these places harbour either 
ambivalence or outright opposition toward welfare statist approaches in 
economic and social policy. Urbanised communities also turn out less often to 
vote. In poor and low-density suburbs, backlash from cultural liberalism and 
cosmopolitanism have further undermined support for the Left. The resulting 
electoral incentives for both the Left and the Right have compounded the social 
and economic disadvantages of poor metropolitan communities with chronic 
underrepresentation in election campaigns and in public policy.  
The widespread shift toward metropolitanisation provides both a powerful 
explanation for these convergent developments, and a basis for understanding 
significant variations in them. The study of metropolitanisation also contributes 
in several broader ways to understandings of how contexts shape political 
behaviour. 
First of all, this study points to a layered dimension of political contexts that 
has rarely been examined systematically. One consistent conclusion has been 
that contextual effects at different scales depend on and interact with each other. 
The size of a community has different effects on turnout in a larger or a smaller 
metropolitan area. Urban cores can harbour Leftist orientations in the largest 
metropolitan regions, but Rightist orientations in more globally-connected or 
smaller metros. Metropolitan and local effects, as the analysis of election turnout 
showed, can also work in different ways under distinct national systems of 
institutions. Analyses of such contextual factors as ethnic and racial diversity at a 
single scale have failed to capture these multilevel influences, which are often 
crucial to the operational significance of context.  
Second, our study demonstrates the need to capture the increasingly 
dynamic, contingent relations between territory and political behaviour. By 
definition, metropolitan areas are functionally interrelated to a degree that earlier, 
less integrated cities and regions were not. In the course of a single days’ 
shopping or commuting to work and back, metropolitan citizens participate in the 
life of numerous communities. Metropolitan areas themselves are constantly 
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changing, not only in territorial extent and in the porousness of their boundaries, 
but in the social, cultural and economic dynamics underlying political behaviour 
and ideology. The thickness of inter-metropolitan economic and social 
connections, including the quantum leap in capacities to transcend territory that 
the internet and other new media have made possible, add to this dynamism. It 
should come as little surprise that some of the most significant contextual 
influences on metropolitan voting patterns reflect complex partisan swings 
among metropolitan constituencies rather than rigidly consistent territorial 
patterns. 
This study represents the first systematic cross-national examination of 
metropolitanisation and its political consequences. Several types of inquiry 
remain necessary to further elaborate and test the analyses undertaken here, and 
as noted above, due to data limitations it has not been possible to test all of the 
conceptual relationships hypothesized in the introduction. At the macro level of 
the nation-state, relationships between the metropolitanisation of society, culture 
and the economy, and the emergence of political divides within metropolitan 
regions remain to be probed more deeply. Comparative historical analysis of the 
trajectories in national policy and their links to metropolitan change, a 
connection that has already been drawn in work on the United States (e.g. 
Mollenkopf 1983; Dreier et al. 2001) remains necessary to account more fully 
for the transformations this research has revealed. At the micro level of citizens, 
more sophisticated approaches to analysis of cross-national surveys must be 
developed to account for the multi-layered contextual effects this study has 
revealed. Even the most elaborate national or cross-national surveys rarely 
sample on sufficiently detailed contextual factors to enable these to be tested in 
relation to individual attributes as well as to each other. A further need persists 
for more intensive qualitative and quantitative investigation of metropolitan 
effects at the local level itself, including the scale of neighbourhoods. 
Community studies of this kind can provide some of the most crucial evidence 
about the links between individual and collective behaviour, as well as between 
the numerous layers of collective action. 
The most powerful impetus to further advances in the study of metropolitan 
political behaviour is the gathering force of metropolitanisation itself. By the late 
twenty-first century metropolitan areas are predicted to be the predominant form 
of settlement in every world region (United Nations 2009). As the examples in 
this volume suggest, metropolitan political ecologies outside of Western Europe 
and North America will bring about new and often distinctive variations on the 
themes elaborated here. Economic, cultural, and political divisions among 
metropolitan places will remain as fundamental a feature of politics as the city 
itself has long been. 
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Appendixes 
Party family classification 
Following Lipset and Rokkan (1967), parties can be seen to have formed around 
social cleavages, and parties that were mobilised on the same side of the same 
cleavage can be seen to constitute a separate party family. Typologies of party 
families given in the literature vary considerably (Mair and Mudde 1998: 223). 
There is, however, a common core of seven party families that also apply to 
party systems outside of Western Europe: far left (e.g. communist and ex-
communist parties), greens, centre left (e.g. social democrats), centre right (e.g. 
Christian democrats), market liberals, far right (e.g. populist right), as well as 
regional and ethnic parties (e.g. regionalist and separatist parties). Parties in 
individual countries were classified into these seven party families by the authors 
of Sellers et al. (2013) (Table A1).  
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Table A1: Classification of national parties into party families 
 Far left Greens Centre left Market liberal Centre right Far right 
Ethnic and regional 
parties 
Others 
USA   Democratic Party  Republican Party    
Canada  
Green Party of 
Canada 
NDP: New 
Democratic Party 
Liberal Party of 
Canada 
Conservative Party 
of Canada 
 Bloc Québécois Difference to 100% 
UK   Labour Party 
Liberal Democratic 
Party 
Conservative Party  
Plaid Cymru 
SNP: Scottish 
National Party 
GPEW: Green Party 
of England and 
Wales 
Others 
France 
LCR: Besancenot 
PT: Gluckstein 
PCF: Hue 
LO: Laguiller 
LV: Mamère 
MDC: Chevênement 
PS: Jospin 
DL: Madelin 
UDF: Bayrou 
FRS: Boutin 
RPR: Chirac 
CAP21: Lepage 
FN: Le Pen 
MNR: Mégret 
 
CPNT: Saint-Josse 
PRG: Taubira 
Switzerland  
GPS: Green Party of 
Switzerland 
SPS: Social 
Democratic Party of 
Switzerland 
FDP: Radical 
Democratic Party 
LPS: Swiss Liberal 
Party 
CVP: Christian 
Democratic Party 
SVP: Swiss 
People’s Party 
 
All other small 
parties (LdU, EVP, 
CSP, PdA, FGA, 
SD, EDU, FPS, 
Lega, Sol.) 
Germany 
PDS: Party of 
Democratic 
Socialism 
The Greens 
SPD: Social 
Democratic Party of 
Germany 
FDP: Free 
Democratic Party 
CDU: Christian 
Democratic Union 
  
Republicans 
NPD: National 
Democratic Party of 
Germany 
Others 
Spain IU: United Left  
PSOE: Socialist 
Party 
 PP: Popular Party  
RD: Regionalist 
Right 
RI: Regionalist Left 
Minorities 
Sweden V: Left Party Green Party 
SAP: Swedish 
Social Democratic 
Party 
FP: Liberal People’s 
Party 
C: Centre Party 
KD: Christian 
Democrats 
M: Moderate Party 
  Difference to 100% 
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Table A1 continued  
 Far left Greens Centre left Market liberal Centre right Far right 
Ethnic and regional 
parties 
Others 
Poland 
PPS: Polish 
Socialist Party 
National Party of 
Retirees and 
Pensioners 
Self-Defence of the 
Republic of Poland 
(Sambroona) 
 
SLD: Democratic 
Left Alliance 
UP: Labour Union 
UW: Freedom 
Union 
KLD: Liberal 
Democratic 
Congress 
UD: Democratic 
Union 
PSL: Polish People's 
Party 
AWS: Solidarity 
Electoral Action 
PO: Civic Platform 
Independent Self-
governing Trade 
Union "Solidarity" 
Catholic Election 
Committee 
BBWR: Non-Party 
Block for 
Supporting Reforms 
PiS: Law and Justice 
LPR: League of 
Polish Families 
ROP: Movement for 
the Reconstruction 
of Poland 
PC: Centre 
Agreement 
KPN: Confederation 
for an Independent 
Poland 
German Minority 
NMGS: German 
Minority of Upper 
Silesia 
RAS: Silesian 
Autonomy 
Movement 
 
Social Alternative 
Movement 
PWN: Polish 
National 
Community 
PUG: Polish 
Economic Union 
PL: Peasants 
Agreement 
KDR: Coalition for 
the Republic 
Party “X” 
Others (Difference 
to 100%) 
Israel   
Avoda (Labor party) 
Shinuy 
Am Echad 
Meretz 
Likud 
Israel Baaliya 
(Russian 
immigrants) 
Merkaz 
Halchud Haleumi 
Mafdal (national 
religious) 
Yahadut Hatora 
(ultra-orthodox) 
Shas (ultra-
religious) 
Ihud Leumi 
Israel Beitenu 
(Russian 
immigrants) 
Balad 
Hadash 
Aravit Meuchedet 
Difference to 100% 
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Table A1 continued  
 Far left Greens Centre left Market liberal Centre right Far right 
Ethnic and regional 
parties 
Others 
Czech 
Republic 
KSCM: Communist 
Party of Bohemia 
and Moravia 
LB: Left Block 
SZ: The Green Party 
SDLSNS: Free 
Democrats-Liberal 
National Social 
Party 
CSSD: Czech Social 
Democracy 
DZJ: Pensioners for 
Social Security 
SDL: Party of the 
Democratic Left 
CMUS: Bohemian-
Moravian Union of 
Centre 
CSNS: Czech 
National Social 
Party 
HA: Humanistic 
Alliance 
NH: New 
Movement 
SZR: Party of 
Common Sense 
SVOS: Party of 
Countryside-Unified 
Civic Forces 
CSD: Czech Social 
Democratic 
Movement 
SZJ: Party for Social 
Security 
SDS: Party of 
Democratic 
Socialism 
ODS: Civic 
Democratic Party 
ODA: Civic 
Democratic Alliance 
US: Union of 
Freedom 
DEU: Democratic 
Union 
KDU: Christian 
Democratic Union 
CP: Czech Right 
DL: Democratic 
League 
VPB: Choice for the 
Future 
NADEJE: Hope 
CZ: The Way of 
Change 
KDUUSDEU 
(coalition election 
’02) 
PB: Right Block 
SPRRSC: 
Association for the 
Republic-
Republican Party of 
Czechoslovakia 
NDS: National 
Democratic Party 
REPMS: 
Republicans of 
Miroslav Sladek 
REP: Republicans 
MNS: Moravian 
National Party 
HSMS: Movement 
for Self-Governing 
Moravia and Silesia 
MDS: Moravian 
Democratic Party 
ROI: Romany Civic 
Initiative 
NEZAV: 
Independents 
OK: Civic Coalition 
BPS: Balbin’s 
Poetic Party 
AZDS: Action for 
Abolition of Senate 
SNK: Association of 
Independent 
Candidates 
57 
 
Table A2.  Definition of variables 
Name  Variable description Source 
Country variables 
  
Metropolitanisation Percent living in metropolitan areas with over 
200,000 population, early 2000s 
Hoffmann-Martinot and 
Sellers 2005 
Civic localism Local government system Sellers and Kwak 2011 
Nationalised local 
government  
Local government system Sellers and Kwak 2011 
Local elitism Local government system Sellers and Kwak 2011 
Third wave democracies Democratisation from 1980s Huntington 1993 
Proportional representation 
(national) 
PR in national lower house elections Blais et al. 2003 
Proportional representation 
(local council) 
From country factsheets, World Report on 
Decentralization and Local Democracy 
United Cities and Local 
Governments 2008 
Election day holiday Election day is holiday or rest day Blasi et al. 2003 
Easy voting index Multi-item index of measures to make voting 
easier 
Blais et al. 2003 
Election day registration Voter registration permitted on election day Blais et al. 2003 
Compulsory registration All eligible voters automatically registered Blasi et al. 2003 
Ethnic diversity Fearon-Laitin index of ethnic diversity Fearon 2003 
Right wins Right wins all national elections during 
period 
Own calculation 
Left wins Left wins all national elections during period Own calculation 
Metropolitan variables   
Population concentration Herfindahl index of population concentration 
by municipality 
Calculated from country 
databases 
Geopolitical fragmentation Index measuring (1) municipalities per 
person, and (2) percent population in central 
city 
Zeigler and Brunn 1980 
Sociospatial polarisation Three-item Simpson index based on 
proportions of affluent suburbs, poor suburbs 
and others 
Calculated from country 
databases 
City-suburban polarisation Multi-item Nathan-Adams index of central-
city disadvantage relative to suburbs 
Hoffmann-Martinot and 
Sellers 2005 
Metropolitan population  Population as of early 2000s From country databases 
Metropolitan affluence Proportion of municipalities classified as 
affluent or middle class suburbs 
Calculated from country 
databases 
Poor nonminority 
concentrations (metro) 
Proportion of municipalities classified as 
poor nonminority 
Calculated from country 
databases 
Poor minority 
concentrations (metro) 
Proportion of municipaliteis classified as 
minority 
Calculated from country 
databases 
Airport passengers/year 
(metro) 
Total annual passengers for all airports in 
metropolitan area 
Airport Council 
International 2007 
Local variables   
Population (log) Municipal population From country databases 
Urban concentrations 1=yes, 0=no From country databases 
Affluent suburbs 1=yes, 0=no From country databases 
Poor minority suburbs 1=yes, 0=no From country databases 
Poor nonminority suburbs 1=yes, 0=no (includes poor suburbs for 
countries without poor minority suburbs) 
Calculated from country 
databases 
Low density suburbs 1=yes, 0=no From country databases 
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Typology of Municipalities 
Following cluster and factor analysis of the characteristics of municipalities in 
several countries, a hierarchical factor analytical procedure was devised to 
classify metropolitan municipalities into six common categories. Each category 
captured a type of municipality that could be found in most, if not all of the 
countries. The types included urban concentrations, low density suburbs, affluent 
suburbs, poor suburbs, minority suburbs (separated from other poor suburbs 
where possible), and middle class suburbs.  
This typology served two purposes. Most important, following the example 
of Orfield (2001), it provided an initial basis for analyzing the variations in types 
of communities and the relation to partisanship and turnout. Beyond this, it also 
served as one among several tests of ecological effects on municipal electoral 
behavior that could not be captured through demographic composition alone. 
 
For classification the following steps are carried out: 
 
1. Urban concentrations: First, the central cities were separated out in 
each metropolitan area. Additionally, a set of factors was used to 
separate out other essentially urban metropolitan towns: 
a) All metropolitan municipalities with half or more of the 
population of the largest municipality were designated as 
urbanised core areas. 
b) In addition, other large urban concentrations were placed in this 
category. These include places with over 100,000 inhabitants. 
c) Localities with densities less than that of the central city were 
excluded from this type. 
2. Low density suburbs: A factor based on density, new housing and 
(where available) distance from the centre was used to separate out low-
density peripheral suburbs. 
3. For the remaining towns, a factor based on the dimensions of 
socioeconomic status derived from indicators for income, poverty, 
housing, education, unemployment, dependents, university education, 
highest status occupational group, and homeownership) is used to 
separate out: 
a) Affluent suburbs: The most privileged communities. 
b) Poor suburbs: The least privileged communities. Where possible, 
this type has been subdivided into two distinct types: 
- Poor minority suburbs: a factor based on racial/ethnic 
diversity was used to separate out high-minority or high-
immigrant concentrations from other poor communities. In 
the Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, Spain, and 
Switzerland, this factor corresponded so closely with socio-
economic status that no distinct poor minority suburbs 
could be distinguished. In Sweden, only one poor 
municipality fell within this category, but several inner city 
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districts did. This type was only separated out for purposes 
of the country chapter in the analysis of municipal turnout 
(which used inner city districts and peripheral 
municipalities). It was employed in the pooled analysis. 
- Poor suburbs (non-minority): least privileged communities 
with low racial/ethnic diversity. 
4. Middle class suburbs: All remaining municipalities were placed in this 
category. 
 
Cut-points for the designation of communities in steps 2 and 3 varied with the 
patterns of distribution. As in the designation of metropolitan boundaries, cross-
national differences in relevant measures as well as in concentrations of 
population, privilege and disadvantage required distinctions between similar 
types of places to be calculated using measures and cut-points distinct to each 
country. The following table summarised the principles used to distinguish the 
different types by country: 
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Table A3: Derivation of municipal typology, by country 
Country  Low density suburbs Affluent suburbs Poor suburbs Minority suburbs Middle class suburbs 
United 
States 
Factors housing built since 1980, 
population density 
affluence index through principle components analysis, based on per capita 
income, education, unemployment and poverty rates 
… 
 indicators for race, ethnicity and immigration 
Separators top quartile of housing 
built since 1980 and lower 
half of population density 
municipalities above 80th 
percentile as measured in 
affluent index 
bottom 30% as measured 
in affluent index that did 
not match the additional 
criteria for minority 
suburbs 
bottom 30% as measured 
in affluent index and 10% 
or more foreign-born 
populations, 25% or more 
African-Americans or 
25% or more Hispanic 
Americans 
Remaining municipalities 
Canada Factors population density high socioeconomic status  low income, high proportion of the population facing 
hardship 
indicators for visible minorities and immigrants 
 
Separators areas with population 
density significantly 
below the suburban 
average (cutoff of 500 
persons / km2 )  
suburban areas with 
combined index of 
average household 
income and high-status 
occupations > 20% above 
the CMA average for the 
index 
suburban areas with a 
hardship index > 20% 
above the average AND 
average household 
incomes less than 90 
percent of the CMA 
average 
- below-average 
proportion of visible 
minorities and immigrants 
suburban areas with a 
hardship index > 20% 
above the average AND 
average household 
incomes less than 90 
percent of the CMA 
average 
- above-average 
proportion of visible 
minorities and immigrants 
all remaining suburban 
constituencies 
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United 
Kingdom30 
Factors Population density Socioeconomic status, proportion of the population facing hardship … 
 proportions of visible minorities and/or immigrants 
Separators Areas with population 
densities significantly 
lower than the 
metropolitan average (cut 
off of 900 pers./km2) 
suburban areas with 
levels of socioeconomic 
status 20% higher than 
metropolitan average, and 
levels of hardship 
approximately 20% below 
average 
Levels of disadvantage 
and hardship greater than 
25% higher than 
metropolitan average31, 
proportion of visible 
minorities and/or 
immigrants below 
metropolitan average 
Levels of disadvantage 
and hardship greater than 
25% higher than 
metropolitan average2, 
proportion of visible 
minorities and/or 
immigrants above 
metropolitan average  
Remaining suburban 
districts 
France Factors Density factor using indicators for 
income and higher 
education 
unemployment rate and minority status (measured by 
foreign-born population) 
… 
Separators 40th percentile or below 90th or higher percentile unemployment rates in 
the 70th percentile or 
higher and residents born 
abroad below 85th 
percentile  
unemployment rates in 
the 70th percentile or 
higher and residents born 
abroad in the 85th 
percentile or higher 
Remaining municipalities 
Switzerland Factors factor based on density, 
new housing, and distance 
to the centre 
factor based on low education, retirees, unemployment, foreigners, low socioeconomic status, non-western 
European language, university education, highest status occupational group, and homeownership 
Separators third 25th percentile third 33rd percentile first 33rd percentile N.A. in-between first and third 
33rd percentile 
                                                 
30  Types of districts based on characteristics derived from the 2001 census at the level of parliamentary constituencies. 
31  Metro average excluding Greater London conurbations (for Greater London conurbations: London average proportion foreign born. 
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Germany32 Factors population density standardised hardship index based on unemployment rate, living space per capita, university degree, local tax 
rates 
Separators lowest quartile top quartile lowest quartile N.A. in-between lowest and top 
quartile 
Spain 
 
Factors density and distance to the 
centre 
Two criteria: 
(1) socioeconomic factor based on: low occupational status (% manual workers), unemployment rate, low 
educational status (% less than university) and living space (household members/household surface) 
(2) immigration: % population born abroad 
Separators lowest quartile of density 
and highest quartile of 
distance to the centre 
(simultaneously) 
(1) socioeconomic: 
highest quartile 
(1) socioeconomic: lowest 
quartile 
(2) immigration: < 
median 
(1) socioeconomic: lowest 
quartile 
(2) immigration: > 
median 
(1) socioeconomic: 
second and third quartiles 
Sweden Factors factor of income and 
education,  
factor of density and 
distance to the center 
factor of income and 
education 
factor of income and 
education,  
percentage born abroad 
factor of income and 
education,  
percentage born abroad 
factor of income and 
education,  
factor of density and 
distance to the center 
Separators medium socioeconomic 
status, low density/long 
distance 
high socioeconomic status low socioeconomic status, 
low percentage born 
abroad 
low socioeconomic status, 
high percentage born 
abroad 
medium socioeconomic 
status, high density/short 
distance 
Poland Factors index based on population 
density, new housing per 
capita (2001-2005), 
(minus) weighted by 
distance from the central 
city 
hardship index based on Nathan and Adams concept using the sum of the 
standardised values of different indicators: level of unemployment 2002, level of 
education 2002 (proportion of residents with university degrees among all 
residents 15 years and older), housing conditions 2002 (number of rooms per 
capita), wealth of local population 2002 (average income of tax payer), and 
dependency index 2002 (proportion of population of non-productive age) 
… 
Separators lowest quartile lowest quartile highest quartile N.A. remaining municipalities 
                                                 
32  In view of socioeconomic differences in Western and Eastern Germany the author created a separate typology of communes for these two parts of the country. 
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Czech 
Republic 
Factors population density socio-economic index through principal component analysis; indicators: 
percentage of poor households 2003, unemployment rate 2001, population with 
low (lower than secondary) education, percentage of university graduates, 
percentage of people older than 65 years, and per capita revenue of municipality 
from personal taxes paid by local citizens 
… 
Separators lowest quintile highest quartile lowest quartile N.A. remaining municipalities 
Israel Factors      
Separators  SES 8-10 (10 – highest) SES 1-4 Arab majority SES 5-7 
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Partisan Ideological Indexes 
Indexes of partisan ideology were constructed on the basis of responses among 
voters for each party to questions about those issues in post-electoral or other 
contemporaneous surveys. Insofar as possible, the items employed in the indexes 
came from a battery of identical questions posed in most of the countries in the 
study as part of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) or the World 
Values Survey (WVS) from 1998 to 2003.
33
 
The indexes were designed to provide clear, cross-nationally equivalent 
metrics to assess the ideological propensities of the parties, and ultimately the 
communities that voted for them. This purpose made formative indexes more 
appropriate for the analysis than the reflective indexes that have often been used 
in survey research (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Questions chosen for each index 
captured a range of issues for which responses could be arrayed along the same 
general conceptual axis. In a formative index, each item measures a potentially 
different component of the common dimension. As a result, unlike a reflective 
index, this type of index cannot be constructed through a method based on 
correlations among item responses such as factor analysis (Diamantopoulos and 
Winklhofer 2001; Coltman et al. 2008). Indeed, a formative index requires no 
correlation among the individual items to be valid. Instead, items aggregated into 
each index were simply assigned equal weight and a standardised range. 
Surveys and items used for the three dimensional indices in each country 
are published in Sellers and Rochat (2013). 
                                                 
33  Exceptions were made for Switzerland and on some items for Poland, where low levels of party 
identification left sample sizes for some parties in these cross-national surveys too small to 
permit reliable inferences. For Canada, the indexes employed later surveys more 
contemporaneous to the elections in the analysis. In all these cases, the questions employed 
remained similar if not virtually identical to those used to construct the indexes in the other 
countries. 
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Municipal Ideological Positions 
Drawing on the partisanship indices, average issue positions of communal 
electorates were constructed on the basis of the percentage of votes for each 
party in a given commune. This portion of the analysis applies a formula 
developed by Gross and Sigelman (1984) to estimate the “ideological centre of 
gravity” for a community.  
 
For each municipality, this procedure applies the following formula:  
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where:  
 pos = issue position 
 i = municipality 
 p = party 
 n = number of parties with votes in municipality i 
 
The same procedure was employed to derive estimates of left-right self-
placement for each municipality. 
The resulting ideological estimates require important caveats for proper 
interpretation. As artefacts of both party performance in a community and the 
positions of the aggregated national electorate for the parties, they represent a 
mapping of wider patterns of party competition as well as the actual preferences 
of the local voters. To fully sort out these elements, and to test the entire pathway 
of effects from metropolitanisation on voters, parties and axes of partisan 
competition, would require a much more complex research design than has thus 
far been attempted.  
The current analysis suffices to show that, however these causes sort out, 
the metropolitan patterns they have produced are now a fixture of contemporary 
politics. 
 
 
 
 
